A daily dose of philosophical food for your noodle... bacon for your brain!

Sunday, October 31, 2004

Our Choice

By Diana Hsieh

The season premiere of South Park, which Paul and I are watching now, sums up our choice in the Presidential election all too well. We must choose between a Giant Douche and Turd Sandwich.

Despite some sympathy for the Giant Douche, he deserves to lose. So I'll be voting for the Turd Sandwich, even though I find the mere thought extremely repulsive.

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Saturday, October 30, 2004

Blubber Blubber

By Diana Hsieh

Americans really are getting fatter and fatter, as this set of yearly obseity maps shows. It's pretty scary, particularly when you consider just how fat people have to be in order to be obese. For instance, given my height of 5'8", I would have to be almost 200 pounds in order to obese! I wouldn't even hit the overweight mark until 165 pounds! Given that I was looking pretty porky at 155 pounds last winter when I declided to lose those extra pounds, I shudder to think of what Overweight Diana would look like in the mirror, let alone Obese Diana.

Since I was always within the "normal weight" range, my recent weight loss does my blessed state of Colorado no good. But it delights me a great deal -- and that's far more important. I suspect that Paul, who has transformed himself into a svelt god-like man over the past year with exercise and diet, is probably pleased too. (But unlike him, I still have some fat to burn off.)

Interestingly, I think that my high level of fitness helped me recover from the flu faster than usual. I was back to rowing 4-5 miles every other day (albeit somewhat slowly) within eight days of the onset of symptoms, despite a lingering cough. I hope to be back up to a full workout next week -- meaning running and/or rowing about 5 miles per day. Then again, maybe it was the drugs. (I took TamiFlu, an anti-viral.) Either way, I'm very glad to be substantially on the mend.

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Friday, October 29, 2004

On Not Having Sex

By Diana Hsieh

Ever wondering how to manage not to have sex? If so, this article might be of help. If not, read it anyway, as it's damn funny.

And since this is a philosophy blog, I should also link to Will Wilkinson's post on the grave problem of inequality in sexual satisfaction. Utilitarians and other egalitarians tend to focus on inequality of income, but sexual gratification is often more critical to happiness than money. And given diminishing marginal utility, utilitarian husbands blessed with lusty wives would be morally obliged to encourage them to transfer some of that lustiness to lonely men. Or maybe, as Will suggests, the government should institute a system of vouchers for hookers.

Hrmph, I bet poor J.S. Mill never thought of that!

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The Story of Ketchup

By Diana Hsieh

Soon-to-be-Mrs-Volokh linked to this great article on ketchup. Yes, you heard that right, ketchup. I remember Malcolm Gladwell's article on the technology of diapers as fabulous. His full article archive is here.

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Bill's Lawsuit

By Diana Hsieh

Perhaps I wasn't paying sufficient attention, but I must admit that I expected the sexual harassment lawsuit against Bill O'Reilly to drag on much longer. I suspect that these speculations on the settlement from a trial lawyer are basically right; Bill probably ponied up a substantial settlement to make the case go away.

Sexual harassment law is a complete farce. The proper response to boorish behavior are sharp words of disapproval and perhaps even public humiliation, not a lawsuit. The proper compensation is an abject apology, not millions of dollars.

The other day, a professor of mine made a sexually explicit joke in the course of casual conversation outside of class. (It was really a geeky philosophy joke about induction; the reference to his penis was merely incidental, although certainly connected to the background discussion about ugly ties -- but never mind all that.) I shudder to think of just how "traumatized" and "intimidated" I could have been by it all. If I were a twitchy man-hater, I could have easily twisted his words to make him sound like a dangerous sexual predator -- and thereby ruined his career. Of course, that would be completely pathetic, not to mention deceptive, malevolent, and unjust. That doesn't seem to be an obstacle for some women.

If Bill O'Reilly did what he is accused of doing, shame on him. But hearing a few dirty comments does not entitle anyone to millions of dollars of compensation.

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Wednesday, October 27, 2004

Wiki-freaky-pedia!

By Diana Hsieh

My longtime friend Jimmy Wales certainly gets lots of well-deserved press for Wikipedia, but does this article really mean that I can find his bearded face in the latest Newsweek in my local grocery store?

If so, wow.

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Sunday, October 24, 2004

Front Range Objectivism

By Diana Hsieh

We're official! Now Front Range Objectivism has a glorious new web site. Happily, it's just in time for Andy Bernstein's visit to Denver for FROST in early November. On Friday November 5th, he will be lecturing on "Global Capitalism: The Cure for World Oppression and Poverty" at the University of Colorado at Boulder. The next day, he will be giving a four and a half hour seminar on "How to Be an Impassioned Valuer" in Denver.

Generally, Objectivism is quite busy along the Front Range of the Rocky Mountains. Here's the gist from the FrontRangeObjectivism.com:

FROST (Front Range Objectivist Supper Talks) brings Ayn Rand Institute approved speakers to Denver for delicious dinners and stimulating lectures on a variety of topics about six times per year. Past lecturers include Dr. Lewis on "The Failure of Homeland Defense," Dr. Ridpath on "In The Dawn's Early Light: Patrick Henry," and Dr. Brook on "The Morality of War" and "The State of ARI." Anyone is welcome, including people unfamiliar with Objectivism.

FROG (Front Range Objectivist Group) is a discussion group that meets monthly in members' homes. With about 20 active members at each meeting, the group is currently at capacity. (A second discussion group will be formed if enough Objectivists from FROST and FROLIC are interested.) FROG members differ in the depth of their understanding of Objectivism, but all are deeply committed to understanding and applying the principles of Objectivism in their own lives.

FROLIC (Front Range Objectivist Laughter Ideas and Chow) is a social group which meets at least once per month at a Denver restaurant. Other fun events may be scheduled according to the wishes of participants. All friendly people with a serious interest in or honest curiosity about Ayn Rand's philosophy are welcome.

Also, the University of Colorado at Boulder has a new Boulder Objectivist Club this year. The club meets every other week on Thursday evenings in Ketchum 301 on the Boulder campus. Contact Jared Seehafer at Jared.Seehafer(at)colorado.edu to join the mailing list.

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Friday, October 22, 2004

Bush Versus Kerry

By Diana Hsieh

Ever since hearing Yaron Brook's talk The Morality of War a few weeks ago, I've been slowly overcoming my substantial revulsion to voting for Kerry. Of course, Kerry is uniformly awful -- although his election would likely create some blessed gridlock in Washington and perhaps even arouse some thoughts of fiscal conservatism by Republicans. Yet Bush's altruistic imperialism concealed by a veneer of tough talk in the War on Terror seems deeply dangerous, in that it discredits the "hawk" position as impractical ineffective.

However, some recent concerns raised by Paul, particularly in combination with similar arguments by Harry Binswanger, have once again placed me on the fence. In particular, the (almost) complete dominance of the universities by the left ought to indicate that the nihilism, altruism, and collectivism of the left is very much alive, if not well. That worries me, even though I regard religion as the more powerful and dangerous force in the long run. And perhaps that religion is best combated directly at this point, i.e. with the Bush administration in power. If Kerry is elected, I fear a worse situation in which the newly mobilized religious opposition paints itself as the only alternative to the surrendering subjectivism of the left. Then again, if Bush is elected, appeasement and UN-style multilateralism will be presented as the only alternative to his failed policies in the War on Terror.

Oy. It's bad all around, I think.

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Tuesday, October 19, 2004

Flu, Flu, and More Flu

By Diana Hsieh

Since I'm presently in the grip of the flu, this article on the pernicious effects of bad government on vaccines is entirely too relevant to my life right now. (Via InstaPundit.)

Update: Okay, now I'm really mad. My husband -- a physician -- cannot get a flu shot. But Joe Lieberman will get one because he might spread the virus to his constituents?!? And what of Paul spreading the flu to his patients? Or me spreading the flu to my students? Or anyone spreading the flu to anyone else?

Oy, nothing like self-serving rationalizations for government privilege!

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Not a Good Opener

By Diana Hsieh

For some strange reason, I didn't find this bit of socially conscious spam all that compelling. But it was pretty damn amusing.

Dear Ms Diana Hsieh

My name is Cindy Wolgemuth. I am contacting you as a respected intelligent, Constitution-friendly, socially-conscious individual who knows and sets an example of what sustainability, American Capitalism, and opportunity can do for ordinary, hard-working folks.

The point is that WE need YOU [personally] and your colleagues as past benefactors of environmental and community social issues to help build a healthy country and encourage a responsible, knowledgeable next generation.

Kindred Haven Integrated Community Care System has planned a community project [under the fiscal sponsorship of S.E.E.] that would be beneficial to a number of citizens. KHICCS intends to promote and focus on education, self-reliance, environmental awareness, participation , and philanthropy. The sticking point has always been the 'land'. We have found and researched several locations suitable for a project of this size and type; all of them in the South [for a variety of reasons]. We have been told that there is funding available for each of the programs we propose, but we need help to secure the land. You know, yourself, that without the land there is no project....without the place from which to serve....

Below, I offer you a brief synopsis of the project and ask that you contact me in any capacity you are willing and able to offer-- advisory, financial, letters of support to various grant-making organizations and/or by generating interest in KHICCS among your colleagues.

KHICCS intends to build a mixed income, environmentally sustainable, community land trust in a rural area less than one hour from a town/small city and within two hours travel time of a larger metropolis. "Kindred Haven" proposes to consist of approximately 85 one acre single-family homesteads and 4 8 unit multi-family buildings, with approximately half of the homes designated to aid low/moderate income families. All dwellings and other buildings will be constructed utilizing a 75%+ standard of sustainable/alternative building materials and energy sources.

"Kindred Haven" will, also, consist of community member owned/operated cottage industry style businesses [i.e. B&B/tavern, Reiki-Massage Therapy Clinic, retail shops, camping facility, Farmer's Market]; community services such as Kindred Kids [5-17 year olds learn literacy, character, environmental preservation projects, life and craft skills, history, culture, etc], Adult workshops [studies of character, literacy, history, religion, environmental preservation projects, life and craft skills, health, etc], food donation coalition, hiking trails, public garden and picnic areas; community-supported, organic, agriculture; as well as community sponsored fund-raising/educational events [featuring Pow-Wow, Food Fest, Living History]..

KHICCS proposes to create a site map for a Community Land Trust [not government-sponsored Conservation Easements], a number of acres to be donated for Native American usage, a number of acres for a responsible agro-forestry program [to generate income as well as provide environmental education opportunities], and any remaining acreage to be reserved for future environmentally friendly endeavors such as community expansion, hemp or bamboo manufacturing, wildlife preserve, educational center, etc.

Our members have been busy developing and selling several natural/organic and/or hand-crafted products in order to raise funds specifically for Land Acquisition, but as you may know; that is a slow process. We at Kindred Haven Integrated Community Care System earnestly anticipate the establishment of solid support from and fruitful association with successful, responsible, like-minded people. Please see our website for further information: www.freewebs.com/khiccs/ and contact me with your questions and input.

Thank you so much for your time.

Cindy Wolgemuth


I guess that I must not be much of a "respected intelligent, Constitution-friendly, socially-conscious individual who knows and sets an example of what sustainability, American Capitalism, and opportunity can do for ordinary, hard-working folks"!

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Sunday, October 17, 2004

Ayn Rand the Hedonistic Utilitarian

By Diana Hsieh

Did you know that Ayn Rand was a hedonistic utilitarian? Neither did I. But so says Dr. Abdullah Robin:

Many blame the US neo conservatives for threatening to embroil the west in a never-ending conflict with the Muslim world, but I believe that we are also witnessing another conflict, not between the west and Islam, but between western values and western philosophy. If only half as much attention were focused upon that front the world might gain something from the shame and scandal of Abu Ghraib. Western philosophy is of course varied, but secularism lies at its core. After releasing their societies from control by divine moral codes defining right and wrong, western societies have had to improvise. Many of the high sounding values of the west are based upon unprovable assumptions about the rights of man derived from consideration of man's nature. The more pervasive utilitarian trend does not start from assumptions about nature or divine rights but upon the utility of increasing pleasure and removing pain. Of course one mans pleasure may cause another mans pain, so nineteenth century utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill devised methods, based on the idea of mathematical calculus, to balance pain and pleasure quantitatively for the maximum number of people. Mill went on to introduce a qualitative aspect to the subject that would give the state a degree of paternalism and reduce the chance of persecuting the minority for the sake of the greater good of the majority. An example of the application of this idea can be found under the heading, "the ethics of emergencies" in "The Virtue of Selfishness" by Ayn Rand: "If the [drowning] person to be saved is a stranger, it is morally proper to save him only when the danger to one's own life is minimal; when the danger is great, it would be immoral to attempt it... Conversely, if one is drowning, one cannot expect a stranger to risk his life for one's sake."


Um, I think not.

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Friday, October 15, 2004

Google Desktop

By Diana Hsieh

If you've ever wondered why it's easier to search the web than your own hard drive, say hello to your new best friend: Google Desktop. It's quite astonishing!

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Thursday, October 14, 2004

Was Kant Necessarily Dishonest?

By Diana Hsieh

I wrote the bulk of this post a number of weeks ago, but then abandoned it as other work piled up. Instead of re-writing it to be entirely current, I decided to just clean it up a bit and post it, as I'm still quite interested in responses to my ruminations and questions. In other words, although my thoughts on this matter have progressed somewhat, I wouldn't regard them as settled.

This semester, I'm taking a class on Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason from one of my favorite professors, Bob Hanna. (I took two good semesters of philosophy of mind from him in my first year at Boulder.) In order to thoroughly learn the material of this profoundly influential work, I've adopted the procedure of first reading the text carefully, then later reviewing and writing some notes on it. I actually typed the whole long passage from the B Preface below into my notes, as it fairly well encapsulates Kant's basic project in the First Critique. (I added paragraph breaks to facilitate reading for the blog.)

As you read it, remember that Kant regards Hume as having absolutely demonstrated that the concept of causation cannot be derived from experience. Moreover, after considering the "general form" of Hume's skeptical arguments, Kant claims that the whole of metaphysics consists of concepts relevantly similar to causation, i.e. synthetic a priori concepts. (Kant recounts that bit of intellectual history in the Preface to the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, pages 257-61.)

For those unfamiliar with Kant's terminology, "cognition" concerns any mental representation, "intuition" is sense perception, and "understanding" is reason.

Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us.

This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make good progress in the explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest.

Now in metaphysics we can try in a similar way regarding the intuition of objects. If intuition has to conform to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori; but if the object (as an object of the senses) conforms to the faculty of intuition, then I can very well represent this possibility to myself.

Yet because I cannot stop with these intuitions, if they are to become cognitions, but must refer to them as representations to something as their object and determine this object through them, I can assume either that the concepts through which I bring about this determination also conform to the objects, and then I am once again in the same difficulty about how I could know anything about them a priori, or else I assume that the objects, or what is the same thing, the experience in which alone they can be organized (as given objects) conforms to those concepts, in which case I immediately see an easier way out of the difficulty, since experience itself is a kind of cognition requiring the understanding, whose rule I have to presuppose in myself before any object is given to me, hence a priori, which rule is expressed in concepts a priori, to which all objects of experience must therefore necessarily conform, and with which they must agree.

As for objects insofar as they are thought merely through reason, and necessarily at that, but that (at least as reason thinks them) cannot be given in experience at all -- the attempt to think them (for they must be capable of being thought) will provide a splendid touchstone of what we assume as the altered method of our way of thinking, namely that we can cognize of things a priori only what we have ourselves put into them. (CPR B xvi-xviii)


One could say a great deal about Kant's basic project. Yet my thoughts on it of late have largely concerned the question of whether a philosopher could ever honestly reject the idea that "our cognition must conform to the objects" in favor of the view that "objects must conform to our cognition." In other words, can we judge Kant as necessarily dishonest on the basis of his ideas alone?

In an attempt to understand the issues involved a bit more clearly, I recently re-listened to Leonard Peikoff's two lectures on Kant from his History of Philosophy (HP) course, as well as his discussion of inherent dishonest ideas in the final lecture of Understanding Objectivism (UA). In the UA lecture, Peikoff argues that since intellectual honesty fundamentally consists of working to rationally conform one's ideas to the facts of reality, then no outright rejection of reason and reality can be honest. Yet he denies that that implies, for example, that Plato was necessarily dishonest for downgrading the world of sensibility in favor of the world of Forms, since he was still working to conform his thoughts to a (mistaken) understanding of reality. Similarly, even skeptics like Hume were often unable to take their own ideas all that seriously, even though they could not refute their own skeptical arguments. In sharp contrast, Kant explicitly rejects the basic aim of rationally understanding reality -- asserting that such is not merely impossible but also unimportant. That basic analysis makes good sense to me, yet the case for Kant's dishonesty still seems like too much of a floating abstraction, i.e. a mere deduction from some abstract principle.

On the one hand, I have no trouble recognizing (1) the ways in which Kant's philosophy makes mincemeat of fundamental and self-evident truths of philosophy, (2) the terrible destruction wrought upon Western civilization by Kant's "Copernican Turn," and (3) the fact that Kant, as a well-educated professional philosopher, ought to be held to a higher standard than ordinary folks. Moreover, I do not think that a philosopher can arrive at any conclusions whatsoever honestly; consciousness is not infinitely malleable. Yet perhaps I don't understand all that well enough, as I cannot quite wrap my mind around the conclusion that he was necessarily dishonest on the basis of his horrid philosophy. His writings seem too civilized for that, although perhaps that is merely a clever disguise. (Notably, many of the examples from his ethics are downright revolting.) Perhaps I am seeking some sort of explanation for Kant's destructive rejection of reality -- but perhaps that is neither possible nor reasonable nor necessary. Really, I'm not sure.

Any thoughts?

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Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Popular Vote, Schmopular Vote

By Diana Hsieh

Since the nationwide popular vote in the Presidental Election counts for exactly zippo, I suggest ignoring the regular polls in favor of this Electoral Vote Predictor. Bush is currently ahead by 14 votes. (Via Josh Zader.)

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More Delights from LewRockwell.com

By Diana Hsieh

Well now, this new essay, The Objectivist Death Cult by Justin Raimondo, is just delightful. The opening insults of Leonard Peikoff's sanity were beyond sophomoric, but the characterization of Yaron Brook's lecture The Morality of War as expressing "maniacal bloodthirstiness" and "complete thuggishness" was more than I could bear. (I heard the lecture live at CU Boulder almost three weeks ago. Despite my initial skepticism, I found his arguments extremely compelling. I would strongly recommend that people listen to the lecture, free to all registered users of the Ayn Rand Institute web site, and judge for themselves.)

Here's Raimondo's ever-so cutting analysis:

How can people who claim to hold "rationality" as their highest value sink to such depths of depravity? The problem is that these people are living in a fantasy world of pure abstractions, in which everything is viewed through the lens of a Manichean struggle between Reason and Unreason, Modernity and Primitivism, the West and the Rest. The humanity and reality of anyone deemed "irrational" is defined out of existence, so that it's okay to torture and kill six-year-olds. Because, you see, they aren't really people. Not like us.


Uh huh.

Honestly, I couldn't force myself to do more than skim the rest.

Update: However, Mike M. managed to quote and annotate.

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Saturday, October 9, 2004

Our Friend Jaques

By Diana Hsieh

Well now, this headline indicates good philosophical news: French philosopher Derrida dies. I was unfortunate enough to read a some Derrida in a continental philosophy course at WashU many years ago. Unsurprisingly, the Teaching Company lecture from the Great Minds of the Western Intellectual Tradition on his ideas was far more comprehensible than his own deliberately obscure works. Yet even when rendered comprehensible, his ideas were still somewhere between idiotic and nihilistic. So good riddance to Jaques!

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Thursday, October 7, 2004

The Teaching Company Loves Me

By Diana Hsieh

Since I've been zipping through my courses from The Teaching Company during my commutes to and from school, I just ordered a slew of tapes on Greek, Roman, and Middle Ages history, philosophy, literature, and religion.

Just recently, I finished up Great Ideas of Psychology. I actually enjoyed the course a fair bit, largely because Daniel Robinson took an explicitly philosophical approach to his survey of the subject. Since I've never taken any psychology courses, but just read various books on topics of interest, I didn't fully grasp the utter mess of the discipline until hearing the course. (Robinson seemed to be aware of that defect to some substantial extent, interestingly enough.) To my surprise, Robinson was fairly well-versed in the psychologies of Plato and Aristotle; they were featured in early lectures -- and Aristotle was frequently referenced and discussed in later lectures as well. I suspect that neither Robinson's philosophic approach nor affinity for the Ancient Greeks is widely shared in psychology, but I certainly appreciated it!

At the moment, I am enthralled with History of Science: Antiquity to 1700. (The professor, Lawrence Principe, passed the very important "Great Debt of All Science to Aristotle Test" with flying colors.) The other two parts of the series, History of Science: 1700 to 1900 and Science in the 20th Century are with different professors, so I hope that they measure up.

One of these days, I should put together a place for Objectivist reviews of Teaching Company courses. Most of their courses are excellent, but a few -- such as History of Freedom by Rufus Fears -- were atrocious. So recommendations from philosophically reliable folks would be a lovely resource. Now if only they had an "affiliates" program like Amazon...

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Wednesday, October 6, 2004

The Problem of Specialization

By Diana Hsieh

For the past few months, I've floundered about in my attempts to determine even a broad area for specialization in philosophy, i.e. history of philsophy versus metaphysics and epistemology versus ethics. To some extent, I've resisted the push for specialization. Such seemed premature while I was still only an M.A. student. In addition, my broad range of interests, as well as my demanding conception of the range of knowledge required for good philosophy, created some reluctance. The limits imposed by the departed-but-not-yet-replaced faculty in the Philosophy Department at Boulder were also daunting. I was quite unhappy and frustrated with my apparent options -- and quite worried in light of the impending doom of my dissertation. Ethics seemed too derivative and fluffy, despite decent job prospects. Metaphysics and epistemology seemed to involve a tangled, floating mess of contemporary literature. The history of philosophy too often seemed pedantic, pointless, and disheartening. Oy! What to do!

My months of frustrated contemplation finally came to an end today in one of those obvious-in-retrospect epiphanies. My basic conclusion was that I ought to focus on ethics. (Oddly enough, that's the possibility that I've most resisted over the past few years. Then again, perhaps the required resistance is a measure of the strength of my recalcitrant interest.)

As some of my past work indicates, my interests in ethics are substantial and enduring. I am quite eager to work on topics like moral development, major and minor virtues, the structure of moral arguments, the Objectivist meta-ethics, conflicts of interest, and so on. I'm also quite interested in the "classical ethical theories," i.e. the ethics of Aristotle, Hume, Kant, and Mill. Yet the particular topics of ethics are not the only draw. Ethics is quite amenable to integration with outside interests such as psychology and history. Much of epistemology is also normative by way of virtue of rationality. But perhaps most importantly, ethics engenders a certain healthy approach to philosophy as relevant and important to human life. Of course, that's hardly universal to contemporary ethics, but it's more common than in the history of philosophy or metaphysics and epistemology.

Interestingly, as the thought of ethics developed in my mind, my intellectual interests began to take on a clear hierarchical structure. A well-developed understanding of the history of philosophy, a rational metaphysics and epistemology, and a reasonable knowledge of related outside disciplines (like history, economics, science, and psychology) are means to the end of developing thoughtful, well-grounded answers to normative questions. Knowing that hierarchy, my general studies can proceed in a much more focused and purposeful fashion, which is delightful. Plus, I now have a clearer understanding of the necessity of such study, for without the philosophic foundation, integrative principles, and inductive data it provides, I would lapse into ethical fluff.

Of course, none of that is set in stone -- yet it does seem to be the solution to the problems I've been wrestling with for the past few months. Although I don't resent the time I've spent on both metaphysics, epistemology, and the history of philosophy, it does rather suck to be wrong again. Ah well, at least knowing that I'm wrong is a step above simply being wrong.

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Sunday, October 3, 2004

Ayn Rand Society Meeting

By Diana Hsieh

Attendance at the Ayn Rand Society is almost mandatory for all people seriously interested in scholarly work on Ayn Rand's philosophy of Objectivism. This year's meeting will be held at the Eastern APA in Boston on December 28th from 11:15 am to 1:15 pm. The program focuses on "Concepts and Universals: Ayn Rand and Thomas Aquinas." Douglas Rasmussen (of St. Johns University) will speak on "The Problem of Universals: Rand and Aquinas," then Robert Pasnau (of the University of Colorado) will comment. (And yes, I'm tickled pink about Bob Pasnau!)

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Grading

By Diana Hsieh

Yesterday, I started grading my first batch of short papers from the "Introduction to Ethics" class for which I am a T.A. (Since it's my first year in the Ph.D program, it's also my first year as a T.A. I teach two hour-long "recitation" sections during the week, plus grade papers and exams.)

The first paper I read was a utter nightmare of incomprehensibility. It did not contain a single grammatically correct sentence. In fact, the grammar was so twisted that I could discern only a single coherent claim in the whole paper, despite great time and effort. Thankfully, the subsequent papers have gotten much better, although I'm not sure that they could have gotten much worse.

Unfortunately, grading is taking me forever -- even though the papers are just 2-3 pages long. But I'm starting to get a sense for what constitutes A, B, C, D, and F papers. But still, it's slow going.

At least I'll get to watch some football while grading today! I've give any paper read while Peyton Manning throws a touchdown pass an automatic A! (I'm kidding, of course.)

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Friday, October 1, 2004

The Power of Man

By Diana Hsieh

Mount Saint Helens is erupting again, albeit in a small way. As I've watched this possible story over the past few days, it's been delightful to witness our human capacity to predict and plan for such disasters with technology in action. Of course, natural disasters are never a cause for celebration -- but the myriad ways in which we can limit their damage is.

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Thomas Sowell on Marxism

By Diana Hsieh

This morning, I finished reading Thomas Sowell's Marxism: Philosophy and Economics. In some ways, the book was quite frustrating. The discussion of Marxist philosophy was too basic, while the elucidation of the economics came across as little more than a series of floating abstractions. Although Sowell did offer some interesting arguments about the proper interpretation of Marx and Engles, the first eight chapters weren't all that enlightening by themselves. The ninth chapter on the lives of Marx and Engles was revealing in a disturbing kind of way, but it was the tenth chapter which was most philosophically illuminating.

In that final chapter, Sowell focuses on the great errors in the economic theories advanced by Marx and Engles. He argues that the central concept of "exploitation" depends upon the notion of "surplus value" -- and that this "crucial concept in the Marxian theoretical framework was insinuated rather than explicitly established, either logically or empirically" (190). Sowell writes:

As introduced in the fist volume of Capital, surplus value was defined simple as an "increment or excess over the original value" invested in production. From this definition, Marx glided quickly to the conclusion that labor was the factor responsible for this increment in value or of output... It was an assumption deeply embedded in classical economics... [an assumption] devastated by the new conceptions and analyses introduced by neo-classical economics while Capital was in its decades-long process of being prepared for publication.

As a theoretical system, Marxian economics begins the story of production in the middle--with firms, capital, and management already in existence somehow, and needing only the addition of labor to get production started. From that point on, output is a function of labor input, given all the other factors somehow already assembled, coordinated, and directed toward a particular economic purpose... [But] where there are multiple inputs, the division of output by one particular input is wholly arbitrary (190).


(I love the emphasis Sowell places on the somehow in this passage, as it reminds me of Ayn Rand's own characterization of the economics espoused by the looters in Atlas Shrugged.)

A few pages later, Sowell summarizes thusly: "Once output is seen as a function of numerous inputs, and the inputs are supplied by more than one class of people, the notion that surplus value arises from [the] labor [of the proletariat] becomes plainly arbitrary and unsupported (192)."

In addition to stressing the importance of the "managerial ability and entrepreneurial innovation" ignored by Marx, Sowell also notes the importance of "worker's skills and experience" as a form of capital (194). Thus Marx engages in the "fundamental fallacy" of "narrowly conceiving capital to mean physical equipment rather than the human capital which may be vastly more valuable and far more widely dispersed" (195).

Sowell notes that Marx's method of starting in the middle allowed him to "repeatedly ignore the importance of knowledge and risk in explaining the phenomena of a capitalist economy" (198). How so? Because his analysis began with "surviving capitalist firms," i.e. "firms that had correctly estimated consumer demand" and were now "waiting to hire workers," Marx "ignored the key implication of failing firms (a majority of all firms in the long run)--that risk is inherent in anticipating consumer demand, and that profit derives from successfully assuming that risk, rather than from merely hiring people to perform the mechanical aspects of producing goods (198)." After all, "failing firms also hire workers--but their very failure shows that that is no guarantee of receiving surplus value" (198).

Sowell is careful not to blithely attribute the evils of 20th century communism to the communism advocated by Marx and Engles. But he does draw out a number of significant connections which render them both substantially responsible for the horrors of communism in practice. For example, he notes that "the fact that Marx and Engles refused to draw up details of such a [communist] society in advance constituted virtually a blank check for their successors" (206). In addition, "whatever Marx intended, the actual effect of the doctrine of historical justification was to provide wide latitude for the most sweeping violations of every moral principles and every sense of decency and humanity" (207).

Perhaps the most telling example of Marx's ideas in practice is the results of Lenin's early acceptance of the somehow approach to all but labor, as indicated by this quote from State and Revolution cited by Sowell:

Capitalist culture has created large-scale production, factories, railways, the postal service, telephones, etc., and on this basis the great majority of the functions of the old "state power" have become so simplified and can be reduced to such exceedingly simple operations of registration, filing, and checking that they can be easily performed by every literate person, can quite easily be performed for ordinary "workmen's wages", and that these functions can (and must) be stripped of every shadow of privilege, of every semblance of "official grandeur."


In fact, Sowell observes that:

The early history of the Soviet Union provided the most dramatic empirical refutation of the Marxian assumption that management of economic enterprises is something to be taken for granted as occurring somehow. When economic incentives were drastically reduce or abolished in the heady egalitarian period following the Bolshevik revolution, the Soviet economy ground to a halt. Widespread hunger and a halt to vital services forced Lenin to resort to his "New Economic Policy" that restored the hated capitalist practices. The later nationalizing of all industry under Stalin and his successors did not restore egalitarianism. Quite the contrary. There were highly unequal rewards to management, including today whole systems of special privilege stores to which ordinary Soviet workers have no access. Moreover, the managers of Soviet industry have been disproportionately the descendants of the managerial class of earlier Soviet and czarist times (193).


Then comes the noteworthy conclusion:

Many observers have seen these developments as mere betrayals of Marxist ideals, missing the more fundamental point that a crucial false assumption must be corrected in practice if people are to survive. Its continuing sacredness in theory can only produce hypocrisy. The betrayal may be real, but in Marxian terminology, "no accident." A similar process is occurring in China, to which many Western Marxists transferred their hopes after disillusionment with the Soviet Union. This too is seen as simply a betrayal of Mao by Deng, rather than a nation's painful learning from experience that a key assumption of Marxian economics is false (193-4).


The gross falsehoods of Marx's communism is why the lament commonly heard from so many communist sympathizers -- that "true" communism was never put into practice -- ought to be rejected. In fact, the ideals of communism -- collectivism, dialectical materialism, the evils of capitalism, the idea of labor as the source of all surplus value, the goal of reshaping of man's nature, the principle of "from each according to his ability to each according to his need," and so on -- were substantially put into practice by the communist regimes of the 20th century. The fact that the result was widespread starvation, forced labor camps, unbearable misery, totalitarian police states, and mass death is hardly a reason to think that the more consistent application of these ideas would result in blissful paradise.

Sadly, in spite of the overwhelming evidence provided by the Soviet Union, Red China, Cambodia under Pol Pot, and other countries devastated by communism, far too many Western intellectuals remain in thrall to Marxist ideals. As for the possibility of the honest Marxist professor, if the millions of dead under communist regimes do not constitute reason enough for a harsh look at the ideals of communism, then no facts and no arguments could possibly persuade them to abandon their precious ideology. Facts and reasons themselves have ceased to matter to such a person, however civilized, amiable, or open they may appear.

And this leads me to a final criticism from Thomas Sowell about the ways in which Marxism promotes the rationalizations which help sustain it:

Philosophic materialism, in its social environmental version, also provides ways of dismissing ideas according to their supposed origins--"bourgeois," for example--instead of confronting them in either factual or logical terms. Grandly dismissing opposing views as "outmoded" or consigning them to "the dustbin of history" eliminates the need to think about them or to meet their challenge to one's existing presuppositions. Such practices have spread well beyond Marxists. Much of the intellectual legacy of Marx is an anti-intellectual legacy. It has been said that you cannot refute a sneer. Marxism has taught many--inside and outside its ranks--to sneer at capitalism, at inconvenient facts or contrary interpretations, and thus ultimately to sneer at the intellectual process itself. This has been one of its enduring strengths as a political doctrine, as a means of acquiring and using political power in unbridled ways (208-9).


In other words, the ideology of Marxism is explicitly hostile to intellectual honesty. So it's no wonder that committed Marxists persist -- at least within the protected walls of academia -- to this day.

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