A daily dose of philosophical food for your noodle... bacon for your brain!

Friday, April 30, 2004

Moving Down the Food Chain?

By Diana Hsieh

Eric O'Connor of Critical Mass has some interesting comments on her choice to move from her tenured position as a professor of English to teaching English in secondary school. After lamenting the terrible job market in academia, she writes:

There is one market, though, that is WIDE OPEN for humanities M.A.'s and Ph.D.'s, and that is the independent school market. "Independent" is mostly a contemporary code word for "private," though it can also mean "charter." Your Ph.D.--or, if you are ABD, your M.A.--is a very attractive qualification in this market. In contrast to the public school system, it counts as a teaching qualification (thus preventing you from going back to school to get a highly redundant ed school teaching certificate). Independent schools are eager to add people with advanced degrees to their faculty--in part, this raises the profile of the school and looks good to parents and donors, but far more importantly, these schools recognize that refugees from academe can make marvelous high school teachers. They know this to be true because their faculties are already full of them.

The Village Voice piece linked above tells the story of one such refugee, who is happily earning twice what he would have made as an adjunct teaching at a private high school in New Jersey. I've met a number of such refugees from a number of schools this year. The schools themselves have been as different from one another as people are--but at all of them, the refugees say, entirely independent of one another, that the work they have found in the world of independent school teaching far surpasses the academic life. All say they are able to do the sort of intensive, personalized teaching they dreamed of doing as college teachers, but could not do in a higher ed setting; all say they feel more intellectually alive than they did in academe; and all say, too, that they have a much greater sense of purpose and of professional satisfaction than they did in academe. They are palpably happy, and the differences they are making in kids' lives are real and meaningful. They also have summers off and, having jumped the assembly-line production schedule of the academic track, can follow the far more ethical and constructive course of pursuing their own research and writing projects when and as the spirit moves them. The pay ain't bad, either.

Locating and applying for such jobs could not be easier. There are agencies whose entire mission is to match you with schools that are looking for candidates like you. The agencies are entirely free to the candidates. They are not gimmicks. They work.

Why do you hear absolutely nothing about this career option from within academe? Why do academic departments pretend this entirely dignified and deeply meaningful career path does not exist--even though it could be just what many of their otherwise unemployable Ph.D.'s, not to mention their dissatisfied faculty, are looking for? Why do they treat as beneath their notice a type of work that they ought to be embracing as a seriously significant alternative to the dead-end academic career of the adjunct? Do I really have to ask?


The comments from those who have made such career moves bears out her generally positive assessment of this path. The only downside seems to be the complete lack of respect given to the decision by other academics, even though the terrible job market isn't exactly a secret. (Such elitism is relevant to those who do not wish to give up their research goals, as it might make publication much harder, if not largely pointless.) Along those lines, Amanda Leins notes:

I have been following your blog off and on over the last year. I finished my PhD coursework in Classics last year, and decided to say to hell with academe for all of the reasons that you have so eloquently placed before your readers. I now teach Latin, History, and Anthropology at an independent school in NY, and could not be happier with my choice. I left the lofty position of my chosen field after 9 years dedication, both as an undergrad and a grad student.

I would like to add another point of view to why these types of jobs are not heralded by the academic communities. In my field, as in others, I presume, teaching at an institution that is not either a college or community is a sign that the person who left "can't cut it" and his or her work never was and could never be up to the rigorous standards of XXXXX University. From the discussions I had with various members of the faculty at my graduate institution, teaching middle and upper school is really a reflection of the limitations of the person who leaves; there is no personal glory to be earned if it isn't higher ed! Leaving is perceived as admitting that one is weak/unintelligent/not dedicated/insert other adjective here.

I still struggle with my decision--even though I don't regret a moment of it. Nevertheless, the stigma of teaching somewhere else besides a university or college is very strong. Am I happier? Yes. Am I doing what I wanted to do all along, namely teach Classical literature, culture adn archaeology? Yes. Do my peers understand? Many of them do not. To them, I am washed up, a disgrace--good riddance! Despite the fact that I received a fellowship at the graduate level that was university-wide and only open through nomination by department, my presence there in that instituion was clearly a mistake made on the part of the administration; my choice to leave proved that.


For a while now, I've considered teaching in secondary schools as an option. One obvious reason is the general glut in the academic job market. But I also have some particular reasons for wishing to stay in our present location. Paul has an excellent job that would be hard to adequately replicate elsewhere in the country. Colorado is one of only six states that is not either in or approaching medical malpractice crisis, plus the state offers fairly good protection for gun rights. Colorado is also one of the few climates in the United States amenable to both Paul's and my tastes. There is also a large contingent of smart, serious, and friendly Objectivists along the Front Range. Leaving Colorado isn't out of the question, but I'd certainly be reluctant to do it in order to teach at Podunk U. For the moment, I'm simply trying to keep as many options open as possible.

Of course, I can't expect to find too many openings for philosophy teachers in private and perhaps charter Colorado high schools. To get my foot in the door, I'd really need to be able to teach some primary subject, e.g. math, science, history, English. Without a doubt, history would be of the greatest interest to me. Since the course of history is driven by philosophy, the particulars form a basis for philosophical inductions. My interest is not merely driven by philosophy though, as I do find the subject fascinating in its own right.

So my basic thought is that I might pursue an M.A. in history, likely after the Ph.D. in philosophy is finished. Even if I end up in academia, the extra degree might help my job prospects, particularly if I choose related areas of focus in each. Of course, all of that is rather far off. But if I'm going to keep my options open, then I need to plan for it!

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Thursday, April 29, 2004

Details Wanted

By Diana Hsieh

Does anyone have a transcript of Nathaniel Branden's speech "Thank You Ayn Rand, and Goodbye"? It was apparently given at Reason's Tenth Anniversary Banquet in November of 1978. (Was it later published as an article in Reason?) The only bit of it that I could dig up was this quote:

Don't expect anything of her as a person. Don't expect help. Don't expect understanding. Don't expect sympathy. Don't even expect sanity. Say, 'Thank you,' and let go.


Um, wow. That's a pretty clear statement by itself, but I'd like to see the full context.

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Warming the Heart

By Diana Hsieh

Nothing warms the heart like a devastating review of the book The Good, The Bad, and The Difference by "The Ethicist" (a.k.a. Randy Cohen) in Reason Papers. (Via The Volokh Conspiracy)

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Wednesday, April 28, 2004

Hmmm...

By Diana Hsieh

I wonder whether we should infer something about the country based upon these strange translated phrases from phrasebooks. Should I bring my own syringe if I go to Indonesia? Will I begin robbing people if I go to Somalia? Would I be prescribing suppositories often in the Netherlands? How often will I be carried if I am in Nepal? Do most men in Hawaii have breasts in which they might be stabbed? Inquiring minds want to know!

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Monday, April 26, 2004

Velvet Ayn

By Diana Hsieh

A few years back, Robert Bidinotto gave a lecture on spirituality or somesuch at the TOC Summer Seminar. I don't remember the details of his arguments now, nor even the title, but I do know that I wasn't exactly awed. At the time, I derisively joked that his basic advice seemed to be that we all needed Objectivist curio cabinets in which to properly concretize our values.

After a number of years of TOC Seminars in which Objectivist schwag was doled out to various groups apparently under the influence of Bidinotto, my joke didn't seem quite so funny anymore. We got the Ayn Rand stamp in a keychain, a TOC lapel pin, a candy dish, and so on. Although some was useful, most was just fodder for the curio cabinet, I suppose.

By way of explaining my disdain, I'm generally averse to sentimental knickknacks. They are a royal pain to dust and cats always find them insanely appealing. More importantly, they would seem like rather shallow displays of emotion for me, although I understand that others might have deeper attachments.

I recount all of that silliness because when I saw this painting tonight, I thought "Oh gee, wouldn't that be perfect for the wall above the Objectivist curio cabinet?" The echoes of religious kitsch are quite painful actually, particularly when contrasted with its particular content. I wonder who paid $14,000 (!) for it. (Via Will Wilkinson.)

Of course, I do like many of the paintings featured on the web site of Quent Cordair Fine Art... and some of Sylvia Bokor's work looks interesting. But the cognitive dissonance of "Beginnings" was quite harsh.

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I Want! I Want! I Want!

By Diana Hsieh

It is a beautiful day here today, delightfully sunny and warm. After our few days of snow late last week, I'm itching to return to the garden. Instead, I'm stuck working on my paper on zoocentric egalitarianism for my environmental philosophy class. *sigh* If only I was a whim-worshipping subjectivist instead of a rational-teleological egoist, I would be playing in the warm dirt right now. (No, that's not a real wish!) Summer break will come soon enough... so just a few more days of savaging Peter Singer's utilitarian arguments for animal liberation and Tom Regan's deontological arguments for animal rights.

Unfortunately, I will have two school papers to complete over the summer. I've decided to take an incomplete in my Topics in Values class, as working out the details of my arguments on moral luck will take more time than I have left in the semester. Some of the arguments concern issues of moral judgment that I've not yet settled for myself, but will be investigating as I comb through the relevant sections of Truth and Toleration this summer. I also have a half-done paper from the fall semester on Aristotle's action theory, particularly on his view of the relationship between reason and emotion, to complete.

Since I am busy with schoolwork, I haven't had a chance to comment on the vigorous debates in the comments -- and likely won't for a few days. I particularly want to reply to Bill Nevin's challenge to the closed system, as well as make some general remarks on implicit sanction, scholarly standards, and engaging philosophical opponents. So don't think I'm remaining silent because I have nothing to say!

Update: I also hope to say a bit more on the general issue of Objectivism as a closed system, as my views solidified a fair amount after a lengthy discussion with a friend a few days ago.

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A Suprise

By Diana Hsieh

Anyone familiar with vitrol against all things non-liberal in Brian Leiter's blog will be rather amused by the pleasant reference to Amy and Leonard Peikoff in this post. The humorous RNC and DNC convention schedules are worth reading.

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Sunday, April 25, 2004

A Cultural Divide

By Diana Hsieh

Japan is presently in the grip of a national convulsion of blame the victim, authoritarian style:

The young Japanese civilians taken hostage in Iraq returned home this week, not to the warmth of a yellow-ribbon embrace but to a disapproving nation's cold stare.

Three of them, including a woman who helped street children on the streets of Baghdad, appeared on television two weeks ago as their knife-brandishing kidnappers threatened to slit their throats. A few days after their release, they landed here on Sunday, in the eye of a peculiarly Japanese storm.

"You got what you deserve!" read one hand-written sign at the airport where they landed. "You are Japan's shame," another wrote on the Web site of one of the former hostages. They had "caused trouble" for everybody. The government, not to be outdone, announced it would bill the former hostages $6,000 for air fare.

...

Dr. Satoru Saito, a psychiatrist who examined the three former hostages twice since their return, said the stress they were enduring now was "much heavier" than what they experienced during their captivity in Iraq. Asked to name their three most stressful moments, the former hostages told him, in ascending order: the moment when they were kidnapped on their way to Baghdad, the knife-wielding incident, and the moment they watched a television show the morning after their return here and realized Japan's anger with them.


The whole article is well worth reading.

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Saturday, April 24, 2004

Frenzied Denunciations

By Diana Hsieh

What follows is basically a reply to Jim Heaps-Nelson's comment on my post on Objectivism as a closed system. Some of what I say is of sufficiently general interest that I thought it worthy of its own post.

Jim writes:

You state that you are in agreement with Peikoff's statement that the fundamental principles of a philosophy are set down once and for all by its founder. Let's look at a historical example to look at how erroneous this is: the political philosophy of the Founding Fathers. Are you saying that the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery is not an integral part of the Constitution? Clearly this is absurd.


Clearly, it is absurd -- because it's wholly irrelevant to the open/closed system debate. The abolition of slavery with the Thirteenth Amendment did not posthumously change the political philosophies of the individual Founding Fathers who supported the institution. It changed the Constitution and thus the from-then-on governing principles of the nation. The US Constitution might embody certain principles of philosophy, but it is not itself a philosophy.

As for Jim's various criticisms of ARI, let me note a few points. I am not a supporter or defender of ARI. I know far too little about the organization to qualify as such, despite my agreement on the closed system issue. Certainly, I have been quite impressed and even delighted with much of what I've seen from ARI and ARI scholars. I've also realized that many of the common criticisms of ARI heard in TOC circles are simply wrong in various respects. My substantial concerns and questions about ARI policies and practices have not vanished into thin air. Rather, they are being addressed in the course of private conversations with knowledgeable ARI supporters whose judgments I respect and trust.

In fact, Jim's criticism here seems like a prime example of the way in which TOC supporters often leap to the worst possible interpretation of ARI-connected actions:

As Chris Sciabarra has mentioned, ARI has resorted to voice-overs which cover up the voices of Nathaniel Branden and Barbara Branden in their audiotapes. These kinds of Bolshevik-style blank outs are clearly not the hallmark of an organization devoted to the search for truth.


Jim, do you know that the reason for the voice-overs was to rewrite NB and BB out of Objectivist history? Have you asked knowledgeable ARI people about it? Did you even consider whether some other explanation might be possible, e.g. legal reasons related to copyright? Personally, I know basically nothing about this issue -- and that is precisely why I am unwilling to infer dishonesty in the quick and easy way you do.

Also, I know that Peikoff's lecture courses (bought recently) include occasional favorable references to David Kelley and George Walsh. If whitewashing is the driving force that you claim it is at ARI, why would they not have edited out those references too?

So if you have a comprehensive critique of Truth and Toleration, let's have it. If not, by all means continue the debate and critiques but let's lower the level of frenzied denunciations in this Blog.


"Frenzied denunciations"?!? Now that's quite revealing. If you can muster actual arguments against my criticisms of TOC work, you are more than welcome to post them. But I categorically refuse to allow my passion for ideas be used as a weapon against me.

My critiques of TOC work have certainly been passionate. That's not surprising, since the issue matters to me in a very deep and personal way. Moreover, I do not regard passion as inimical to objectivity. TOC has been routinely churning out abysmal crap for some time now. Many TOC supporters are unaware of that, as they long ago lost interest due to sheer boredom. Others do not possess the knowledge or skills to see the problems quickly or clearly. And others offer excuses that need to be exposed as inadequate, even absurd.

Notably, the downward spiral of my basic judgment of TOC begun in late 2002 has persisted even since the publication of my public statement of disassociation. Further thinking, reading, and discussions have resulted in an ever-increasing awareness of the subjectivism and mind-body dichotomy central to the philosophy which justifies TOC's very existence.

As a final note, my long commentary on Truth and Toleration has been delayed by both work for school and a need to think through various issues. I'll be able to resume work on it in June, after the semester and a vacation is over. In the meantime, I'm likely to keep posting more exploratory and preliminary commentary here on NoodleFood.

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Shanghai Fisking

By Diana Hsieh

Gweilo Diaries devastatingly fisks an insanely stupid post from a leftist on the glories of Shanghai. The comments on both posts are also worth reading, if only to see examples of how the failure to think in essentials results in complete blindness to what really matters. As one commenter put this point: "But you are right, who cares about the human rights situation, if the streets are clean and the servants are service-minded."

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Friday, April 23, 2004

Ayn Rand: Bourgeois Individualist ?!?

By Diana Hsieh

Adam Reed offers a scathing critique of Roger Donway's latest Navigator article, Fortress Americanism. My particular interest in it should be apparent from the first paragraph, for there Reed writes that Donway's article is an exemplar of my general claim that "(TOC) minimizes the importance of the wide range of insights, applications, principles, methods, arguments, and logical connections found in the full and rich system of philosophy developed by Ayn Rand." In this case, additional phrases like "ignores," "misunderstands," and "contradicts" are also quite apt.

Before examining Adam Reed's critique, I did carefully read Roger Donway's article. I found it extraordinarily mushy and muddled. Still, after wading through all the confusion, I found much to doubt and much to reject. The central questions of the article did not even makes sense:

Should we welcome this influence [of ideas from abroad on judicial decisions], as we welcome the vitality and fresh perspectives that certain immigrants bring to our economy? Or should we fight against this influence, as we fight against the tribalist and statist ideas that certain immigrants bring to our politics?


Augh, so much wrong packed into so few words! The presumption of these two questions is that the national origin of ideas ought to be regarded as somehow relevant to our response to them. But why should that be? Rational people are concerned with the truth or falsehood of the ideas they encounter, not with irrelevancies like being home grown or imported from abroad. They do not adopt one strategy for fighting domestic ideological disasters and other for fighting foreign ones. Yet such is what Donway recommends in the conclusion of the article:

Those who believe in America's Enlightenment philosophy should not fight these internationalists with the simple-minded doctrine that Americans must not listen to foreigners. We should not erect an ideological Fortress America that keeps out European ideas simply because they are European. But we do need to man the ramparts of an ideological Fortress Americanism that keeps out ideas alien to the philosophy of liberty on which our country was founded.


The twisted ideas about liberty promoted by "internationalists" who look to Europe for guidance are not fundamentally different from those developed and promoted by American intellectuals. All varieties can and ought to be fought on philosophic principle as deeply wrong and dangerous, not superficially hen-pecked as antithetical to our American traditions.

I could say more, but let me instead quickly summarize Adam Reed's more philosophic analysis of the article. In essence, Adam argues that Donway's philosophic arguments constitute "an attempt to disinter and resurrect the zombie of an old dichotomy between 'bourgeois individualism' and 'romantic individualism'" which "Rand killed and buried by presenting a new, integrated, coherent vision of individualism in The Fountainhead." Although I don't know much about the intellectual history that Adam cites, my sense is that his philosophic analysis is correct. Ayn Rand was not, as Donway claims, an advocate of "an extremely bourgeois concept of liberty." (Really, the mind boggles at such a claim. In no way could Roark or any of Ayn Rand's other heroes be aptly described as a "bourgeois individualists.")

I won't say more by way of summary here, as I think Adam argues his case well. If you are at all interested, you should simply go read the article and the critique.

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Occasional Integrity = No Integrity

By Diana Hsieh

On an NYPD Blue episode a few weeks ago, Sipowicz's career is in serious danger due to conflicts with a dangerous but well-connected detective new to the squad. The new captain, Gibson, fails to stand up for justice when push comes to shove, despite compelling evidence that the cop killed his wife some years back. After the bad cop is exposed to all, Gibson admits to Sipowicz that he ought to have done better. What Sipowicz says in reply very aptly, if colloquially, sums up an very important moral principle:

"You gotta stand up for what you believe in, Gibson, not just some of the time."

Amen!

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Thursday, April 22, 2004

Snow Snow Snow

By Diana Hsieh

It's snowing here. Yes, you read that correctly: It's snowing. We are slated to receive between 7 and 11 inches over the next 24 hours!

Although I'm none too enamored of this chilly form of the precipitation so late in the season, I am nonetheless grateful to have it. We had a horribly dry March, so we need as much moisture as we can get now.

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Ayn Rand in Red China

By Diana Hsieh

A newspaper in Shanghai reports that a theater group is performing Victor Hugo's Ninty-Three... and the article quotes Ayn Rand more neutrally and accurately than most American papers can manage:

"The theme -- which is played in brilliantly unexpected variations in all the key incidents of the story, and which motivates all the characters and events, integrating them into an inevitable progression toward a magnificent climax -- is man's loyalty to values,'' said Ayn Rand, the well known 20th century American writer.


Speaking of China, I'm presently reading Steven Mosher's fascinating book on the modern rural Chinese, Broken Earth. His characterizations of the workings of the Chinese bureaucracy, in which personal connections and private interests rule, were quite fascinating.

Also noteworthy was his characterization of the better-off communist peasants, i.e. those working within the "responsibility system" introduced in 1979 rather than the genuinely collective farm. Under that system...

the land is no longer worked in common, but is cultivated by individual households. Each year the team parcels out its land to member families and, following state guidelines, sets production quota for each tract. But it is the family, not the team, that is responsible for turning over the amount of its produce to state purchasing stations. More importantly, it is the family, not any larger group, that owns all production in excess of this quota, free to consume, sell, or store the fruits of its labor as it sees fit. (p. 42)


Given the strong causal connection between work done and food on the table, this system is far more productive than the collective farm, where working at little as possible is the norm. Mosher continues:

County officials, mimicking their Beijing superiors, rather disingenuously denied to me that this means the abandonment of collectivism, pointing out that the land is still owned by the state rather than the households that till it. In fact, the responsibility system is neither collective agriculture nor rural private enterprise, but a return to a form of tenant farming. Thirty years after dispossessing China's landlords, the state has itself become an absentee superlandlord, with the emasculated collective serving as its local representative, each year contracting out its land to hundreds of millions of tenant farmers in return for a share of their crops.


Along somewhat similar lines, albeit far worse, is Robert Conquest's observations about the status of the Soviet peasants in the 1930s in his excellent book Harvest of Sorrow. To prevent Ukrainians peasants from escaping the famine, the Soviet government introduced an "internal passport" in 1932. It established that "a peasant could not leave a collective farm without a contract from his future employers, ratified by the collective farm authorities" (170). This amounted to a rather significant restriction upon the peasant, who was "long accustomed to work in the cities, or to migrate annually... to different areas of work" (170). Then he observes:

The introduction of internal passports, with the tying of the peasant to the land, was thus a major break with the old practice, and implied a serfdom more constrained by law than that of the pre-Emancipation peasant.


The slaves of the Soviet Union were thus substantially worse off than the slaves of the Tsarist times. Ah, but remember, such slavery was the genuine freedom that only Communism can offer! It would be funny if so many millions hadn't died.

More generally, Conquest's stories of peasants who understood that collectivization meant starvation and death are utterly heartbreaking. Peasants slaughtered their beasts and burned down their houses rather than turn them over to the Soviet government. The beasts thus-slaughtered were far better off than those turned over to the collective farms, for there they starved and died just like the peasants.

Although my readings on communism are depressing, they do certainly contain a wealth of inductive data for a philosopher to chew on!

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Wednesday, April 21, 2004

Questions and Comments on the Closed System

By Diana Hsieh

Over on Objectivism Online, a rather active and largely speculative discussion was progressing about my views on the open system versus closed system debate. Unfortunately, the cause of all the speculation was a person who chose -- without my knowledge or consent -- to publish loaded summaries and then select quotes from my brief private e-mail correspondence with him. The whole situation was rather infuriating, although I am grateful to those in the discussion who urged caution. As I figured that some people would continue wrongly speculating on my views unless I actually sketched them, I posted a long comment on the thread this morning.

The relevant portion is reproduced below. Please note that my comments and questions are aimed at those who accept the closed system view. Comments and questions from all are welcome, although I'm presently quite busy writing term papers. So here goes:

First, in "Fact and Value," Peikoff says that the "the essence of the system [of Objectivism]--its fundamental principles and their consequences in every branch--is laid down once and for all by the philosophy's author." I wholeheartedly agree with that statement. Contra Kelley, to reject or revise some principles of Objectivism is to depart from Objectivism. The philosophy is not some loose family of views generated within a school of thought, but a specific system developed by a single person. It necessarily includes many principles regarded as derivative and hence optional by Kelley, such as the axiom of consciousness, the virtues of pride, honesty, and integrity, knowledge as hierarchical and contextual, the form/content distinction in perception, the benevolent universe premise, the value of romantic love, the whole of aesthetics, and so much more. In my view, the claim that Objectivism is an open system is not merely wrong, but disastrous as implemented in both academics and activism at TOC.

In keeping with the above, I also agree with Peikoff that "if anyone wants to reject Ayn Rand's ideas and invent a new viewpoint, he is free to do so--but he cannot, as a matter of honesty, label his new ideas or himself 'Objectivist'." I know and respect many "fellow travellers" of Objectivism, i.e. people who agree with some aspects of the philosophy, but not the whole. Such standing is basically fine by me, so long as the disagreements with Objectivism are openly acknowledged. (Of course, I regard them as in error, but that's another matter.) So long as they approach ideas (including Objectivism) seriously and carefully, debate and discussion with such fellow travellers can be extremely profitable.

Second, in "Fact and Value," Peikoff also says that "the 'official, authorized doctrine' [of Objectivism] remains unchanged and untouched in Ayn Rand's books." Again contra Kelley, I have no objection to the idea of an "official, authorized doctrine" of Objectivism. I deny that such represents a departure from the norms of the history of philosophy. A person wanting to know the definitive Kantian view on some subject ought to consult Kant's writings; secondary sources or later thinkers may be illuminating, but only Kant's writings are authoritative. (Of course, Objectivists also validly use the term "Kantian" to encompass a wide range of philosophic views which trace back to Kant, such as pragmatism and logical positivism. However, such usage is derivative and dependent upon a more restricted understanding of the term as referring to the particular philosophic system developed by Kant.) In addition, Kelley's argument that an authorized Objectivist doctrine generates conflict between the demands of Objectivism and the demands of independence and rationality is an expression of tribalism, not a repudiation of it. Rational and independent people discard labels like "Objectivist" when no longer applicable to them; they do not clutch onto them by arbitrarily weakening and redefining their terms.

I am, however, quite reluctant to limit the principles of Objectivism to only those found in Ayn Rand's books. This limited view is most clearly elucidated by Harry Binswanger in his HBL List Policies, where he writes that "Objectivism is limited to the philosophic principles expounded by Ayn Rand in the writings published during her lifetime plus those articles by other authors that she published in her own periodicals (e.g., The Objectivist) or included in her anthologies." Clearly, such carefully vetted written works constitute the core of the Objectivist corpus. They are the "gold standard" against which all other potential sources ought to be judged. Nonetheless, some other works do seem worthy of standing in establishing the principles of Objectivism, even though excluded by Binswanger's criteria. Most uncontroversially, Peikoff's The Philosophy of Objectivism course was specifically endorsed by Ayn Rand as a presentation of "the entire theoretical structure of Objectivism." From what I understand, other lecture courses given by Ayn Rand's associates were presented with her basic approval. In addition, a wealth of very Objectivist material is found in Ayn Rand's posthumously published letters, seminars, and journals, as well as in recorded Q&As. Also notable are reliable reports of philosophic discussions, particularly those between Ayn Rand and Leonard Peikoff, as he reports taking copious notes over the course of 30 years. Given that such sources were never prepared for publication by Ayn Rand, they ought not be accepted at face value as part of Objectivism, but instead carefully compared against the principles found in the core sources. The often fascinating and illuminating insights in these sources ought not be regarded as mere curiosities irrelevant to the substance of Objectivism.

In essence then, my basic view is that Objectivism includes all of the philosophic principles and methods substantially developed by Ayn Rand, i.e. those elements of her personal philosophy given physical form.

Third, in "Fact and Value," Peikoff says that "new implications, applications, integrations can always be discovered" and that "anyone else's interpretation or development of her ideas, my own work emphatically included, is precisely that: an interpretation or development, which may or may not be logically consistent with what she wrote." Read literally, I am again in agreement with these claims. My question concerns the status of such "new implications, applications, integrations," in particular, whether they are part of Objectivism or not. From what I understand, the closed system answers an emphatic "no." In many ways, this strictly limited understanding of Objectivism seems quite sensible and significant to me. People often claim that some new idea is merely a straightforward and logical development of Objectivism. To passively accept such claims would be idiotic -- and to investigate them requires differentiating between the core principles of the philosophy developed by Ayn Rand and the work of later Objectivist scholars. This strictly limited sense of "Objectivism" is, I would say, the root meaning of the term.

So my question is really whether such is its only possible meaning. In other words, are there contexts in which a slightly broader term -- one which includes later philosophic developments deeply and thoroughly consistent with the core principles of Objectivism -- would be appropriate? From my perspective, it seems that Objectivists, including advocates of the closed system, appeal to this broader meaning rather frequently -- and rightfully so. For example:

  • Objectivists commonly claim that "the Objectivist view on X is Y," even though Y is a later application of the core principles established by Ayn Rand rather than one of those principles themselves. So if an analytic philosopher invents some new object allegedly demanding our sacrifice (such as bacteria, alien invaders, or household pets), we would not be shocked or dismayed to hear Objectivist scholars say that Objectivism rejects that view entirely, even though such a rejection is, strictly speaking, an application of the general Objectivist view on self-sacrifice to this new case.

  • As far as I recall, Leonard Peikoff's lecture course, "Objectivism: The State of the Art," primarily concerns material he learned while writing Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand. On the strict and narrow meaning of "Objectivism," this title seems baffling to me. How could such material fall under the title "Objectivism"? How could Objectivism have a "state of the art" after Ayn Rand's death? Yet such is perfectly comprehensible under a slightly broader meaning of the term.

  • In his excellent course Understanding Objectivism, Peikoff breaks new ground in his detailed discussions of the rationalist and empiricist methodologies, particularly their relationship to the mind-body dichotomy. Such elaboration upon and integrations of already-established Objectivist principles are apparently not part of Objectivism, narrowly construed. Yet the deep connection to Objectivism is undeniable. One of the primary values of such work is that it provides us with the means to substantially enrich our concepts, e.g. those of rationalism, empiricism, and the mind-body dichotomy. Since such concepts refer to all that we might ever learn about their referents and such concepts compose various principles of Objectivism, in what sense can Objectivism exclude such new insights? We might think of many such insights as implicit in the system and thus part of it, even if not explicitly identified until after Ayn Rand's death.

  • In Ayn Rand's writings, some principles of Objectivism were merely asserted, but not explained or justified. For example, she claims that reason, purpose, and self-esteem are the cardinal values, but does not tell us what that means or why that is. Without a good explanation of the meaning and justification of this claim, it stands alone, without any connection to the rest of the system. When a good, deeply Objectivist explanation and justification is offered, should we continue to allow those cardinal values to stand outside the system? Or should we integrate them by incorporating this new understanding into our understanding of Objectivism? The latter seems like the right approach to me, but it also seems incompatible with the strictly closed system.

    To be clear, I'm not advocating any version of the open system here. Instead, my modest proposal is merely that "Objectivism" might also derivatively refer to the full system of philosophy rigorously and consistently developed from the principles and methods established by Ayn Rand. Some people might ask "Who decides what is included and what is not?" Let me answer simply by quote Peikoff: "In regard to the consistency of any such derivative work, each man must reach his own verdict, by weighing all the relevant evidence." Ultimately, the final arbiter is, of course, reality.

    To forestall confusion, perhaps the broader notion of Objectivism ought to be designated "extended Objectivism" or some such. Perhaps instead we ought to say that such later developments are "Objectivist" but not part of "Objectivism." However, I tend to think that the same term could be used reasonably clearly for these two related meanings based upon the context. In any case, unit economy seems to demand a single word to designate the philosophy developed by Ayn Rand plus the valid and consistent "new implications, applications, integrations" of that philosophy. (That's quite a mouthful!) So long as we adequately differentiate between Ayn Rand's philosophic work and the developments of later thinkers by retaining the root meaning of "Objectivism," this modest proposal seems reasonably consistent with Ayn Rand's comments about the use of the term "Objectivism" in the first issue of The Objectivist Forum.

    One final puzzlement: Adherents of the closed system generally claim as justification that Objectivism is a proper noun, not a concept. (Peikoff doesn't say that in "Fact and Value," so I'm unsure of the origin of this idea. Does anyone know?) I've always been rather puzzled by this view. If Objectivism is a proper noun, to what single particular does it refer? None of the candidates I've considered make much sense to me. One option is that the particular could be the philosophic ideas which once existed in Ayn Rand's mind. If so, Objectivism doesn't exist any more -- and no one but Ayn Rand could have been an Objectivist. So surely that's wrong. Another option is that the particular is the sum of the philosophic ideas which Ayn Rand gave physical form. However, those ideas do not exist in some Platonic realm; their physical forms do not possess intrinsic meaning. Individual minds are required to grasp the meaning of the ideas in those physical forms. Yet then we seem to have multiple instances, which excludes a proper name. Such multiple instances also serve as the basis on which to form a concept. Thus I must admit to some bafflement at the proper noun view.

    I hope that sufficiently explains my present views. I'm eager to hear the best contrary arguments that thoughtful and knowledgeable Objectivists can marshal!

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  • Monday, April 19, 2004

    The Epistemological Implications of Smoking

    By Diana Hsieh

    Don Watkins has posted a very long, thoughtful, and interesting analysis of the epistemology of quitting smoking. His comments are, of course, broadly applicable to the cessation of any activity which people pursue for its immediate pleasures, despite the obvious damge it causes in the long run.

    I wonder if I could use a reverse procedure on exercise, which I generally experience as an unpleasant waste of time and energy in the short run, but which obviously benefits me in the long run.

    Much to my surprise, I recently discovered that I am much happier exercising while listening to philosophy lectures. That way, I don't mind taking time out of my schedule, since I'm also doing something that counts as productive. (That's particularly true of my short hikes with the dogs.) Also, my mind is sufficiently engaged such that the ever-present discomfort of exercise receeds into the background. (That's particularly true of running on the treadmill, which is insanely boring even while watching a movie.) My mother made good fun of me for this tactic recently, but that's easy for her to do, as she actually enjoys exercise. I wish I were so lucky!

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    Sunday, April 18, 2004

    A Third Quick Hit

    By Diana Hsieh

    See Star Wars transform into Harry Potter with just a few small editorical changes. (Via GeekPress)

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    Another Quick Hit

    By Diana Hsieh

    I'm not quite sure how to describe the pictures on this site. How about Photoshopped Darwinian Nightmare? (Via Number 2 Pencil)

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    Quick Hit

    By Diana Hsieh

    I really loved this two minute animated gif summarizing Lord of the Rings. (Via GeekPress)

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    Saturday, April 17, 2004

    Friends and Philosophy

    By Diana Hsieh

    My basic policy with the comments on my blog is that I leave all genuine comments (as opposed to the occasional spam) intact. Why? A few reasons: Idiots can hang themselves with their own words. To attempt to draw a fine line somewhere would be a waste of my time. Attempting to justify that fine line would be a further waste of my time. Worst of all, selective editing might give the wrong impression of approving or agreeing with the comments that remain.

    Given that bit of background, I do find Noumenal Self's decision to remove reasonable comments by Chris Sciabarra and Robert Campbell in response to this post puzzling, particularly given the willingness to engage the far less reasonable questions and comments in that very thread. From where I stand, Robert asked a perfectly legitimate and polite question about access to the Ayn Rand archive. And Chris corrected a significant error made in an earlier comment about his prior access to those archives. (Chris's comments on this removal can be found on SOLO. Robert's are in my comments section.)

    Perhaps NS regards both Chris and Robert as obviously beyond the pale. To be clear, I cannot remotely concur with that judgment. Whatever our philosophic disagreements, both have been good friends to me over the years. Along these lines, I should say something about Noumenal Self's comment in that same post about my relationship with Chris. There NS wrote, "Maybe soon she'll turn a similar critical eye to the works of a certain NYU-based dialectical scholar she continues to regard as a friend."

    Chris Sciabarra has been an excellent friend to me over the years. He has consistently encouraged me in my philosophical work. He was both supportive and challenging in our many discussions about my dissatisfaction with TOC. As my friend, he is worth his weight in gold. Notably, my friendship with Chris does not imply agreement with his dialectical approach to Objectivism, nor with his approach to academia. I have substantial questions about the former and substantial doubts about the latter. Both will surely be hashed out over time, using the same critical eye I employ in all intellectual endeavors. Yet our friendship, which is grounded in far more than a mutual interest in Objectivism, will not thereby be brought into question.

    I hope that clarifies somewhat, although whether it satisfies is surely another matter.

    Update 1/24/05: Unfortunately, Robert Cambell since demonstrated his total unworthiness as a friend.

    Update 4/25/06: And I just recently confirmed what I long suspected: Chris Sciabarra routined lied to me and now lies about me. See Dialectical Dishonesty for the details.

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    Friday, April 16, 2004

    Development

    By Diana Hsieh

    One of the obvious challenges of development in technologically primitive societies is the absence of infrastructure upon which the technology of well-developed societies depends, e.g. roads and electricity. The cost of importing technology when the background infrastructure is spotty or even wholly absent is surely often prohibitive. That's why I find simple solutions -- like this pot-within-a-pot refrigeration device -- so fascinating. Apparently, it's already transforming rural life for the better, e.g. by allowing more girls to attend school. Inventing such simple devices requires a special sort of ingenuity for which Mohammed Bah Abba deserves high praise. (Via Andrew Sullivan.)

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    Wednesday, April 14, 2004

    Broken Units

    By Diana Hsieh

    Don Watkins has posted some rather interesting comments on the idea of "broken units," i.e. "a unit [of a concept] that lacks a characteristic shared by the other units of the concept of which it is a member." If you have any interest in the Objectivist epistemology, it's well worth reading either on his blog or as a MS Word document. Based upon my quick first read, his theory seems to solve some puzzles I've always had in reading Peikoff's essay on the analytic-synthetic distinction.

    Don has also been blogging up a storm in response to John Ku's Critique of the Objectivist Ethics. Ku's essay comes in ten parts, and Don has written up lengthy critiques of each part. Start with the first one and just keep going. (Hey Don, how about compiling them all into a nice little file?)

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    Soviet Economics as Primacy of Consciousness

    By Diana Hsieh

    I'm presently reading Robert Conquest's The Harvest of Sorrow, a very thorough and fascinating history of the famine in the Soviet Union that killed millions as a result of Stalin's collectivization and dekulakization of the rural peasants in the early 1930s. In the late 1920s, as this process began, economists were not exactly in support of the attempt to so quickly and radically change the economic structures. But, as Conquest says, "as 1929 wore on there were a number of statements which made clear that [the economists] had the choice of supporting the politicians' new plans or going to prison" (111). Conquest then notes that the political leadership even "imposed an end to economic research in 'mathematical models of growth, studies of investment allocations and effectiveness, models of accumulation and consumption, research on management models, and studies on the scientific organization of labor and many other endeavors" (111-2). Most astonishing is what Stalin's economist Strumilin said about all that:

    Our task is not to study economics but to change it. We are bound by no laws. There are no fortresses which Bolsheviks cannot storm. The question of tempo [of change] is subject to decision by human beings.


    Really, I'm not sure that I've ever seen a more naked advocacy of Primacy of Consciousness in my whole life... and by materialists, no less! Wow.

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    A Twice Baked Heretic

    By Diana Hsieh

    Noumenal Self is blogging again, with a long and interesting post about my disassociation from TOC at the top. Given the title of the post ("Another heretic is created") and his comments on my ten-years-ago decision to side with Kelley, he must be familiar with my original essay about that choice: Yet Another Heretic is Created. That short essay is an interesting historical record of my thinking at the time. Noumenal Self characterizes it pretty accurately, I think:

    I remember thinking at the time that she was smart, but that her decision had been influenced by her exposure to supporters of ARI who were, unfortunately, dogmatic and rationalistic, and hence bad representatives of Objectivism. It was too bad.


    Unsurprisingly, one of the worst, Jay Allen, has since totally rejected Objectivism in favor of something like Buddhist socialism. He even wrote an article about Objectivism not too long ago, but the site seems to be down.

    In contrast to some of those ARI supporters, I was very quickly introduced to many friendly, smart, knowledgeable, and committed Objectivists at then-IOS via Jimmy (Jimbo) Wales. (Notably, most of those people are no longer involved with TOC.) As I was quite new to Objectivism at the time, I strongly suspect that my judgments about the merits of the ideas were heavily influenced by the merits of the people I saw as practicing representatives of each side. At the time, however, I don't think I knew that. If I had, I surely would have seen my inclination toward Kelley's view as merely provisional. I also likely would have sought out some ARI-affiliated academics.

    It wasn't until fairly recently that I recognized the asymmetries in my contacts with people on each side. That was one of the reasons I decided to attend OCON last summer. Although I was frustrated that the conference was not structured so as to make socializing all that easy for newer and/or quieter folks, people were indeed very friendly. So Noumenal Self is again right:

    I know that Miss Hsieh was at the ARI summer conference last year, and that she must have realized that we're mostly not nearly as bad as those gnomes that are to be met in various chat rooms.


    (Granted, he's terribly wrong to call me "Miss." A girl like me doesn't acquire a crazy name like "Hsieh" without marrying a Mr. Hsieh and shedding the "Miss"!)

    I have more to say about Noumenal Self's comments on the meaning of the "closed system" view of Objectivism in that post, but I'll save that for later. In any case, much thanks to him for the thoughtful and supportive comments.

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    Tuesday, April 13, 2004

    A Simple Question

    By Diana Hsieh

    What do you get when a PhotoShop expert combines George Bush's expressive face with the bodies of female celebrities? Yes, you get this little delight.

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    Monday, April 12, 2004

    Chernobyl

    By Diana Hsieh

    David Eiche sent me to a web site describing (with lots of photographs) a motorcycle drive-through of the disaster area of Chernobyl. I found it quite fascinating, although I know little about the disaster. (I was only 11 at the time. Paul in the middle of medical school. Heh.)

    Since I'm presently devouring a multitude of books on Soviet communism... and thinking about nuclear power in my environmental philosophy class, does anyone have any book recommendations on Chernobyl? I'm more interested in the political response than the scientific details.

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    From Blushing to Error

    By Diana Hsieh

    High though my self-esteem may be, the praise in these comments from Matt on this post is certainly more than enough to turn my cheeks red.

    I do strive to write in a clear, straightforward, and engaging style, so I'm glad to hear that I'm succeeding in that to some substantial degree. Of course, much progress remains ahead of me, but at least I seem to be heading in the right direction.

    One of the tricks I use is to envision an audience entirely composed of my mother. She's a smart, sensible, and active thinker and reader, but definitely outside the scholastic world of academia and only somewhat familiar with Objectivism. If I can't explain some philosophical issue to her, then most likely I'm suffering from some form of rationalism. My husband is also a good focal point, particularly when I'm writing for a more academic or Objectivist audience, since he knows quite a bit about both without being an expert in either. A third target audience is composed of the good folks of Titan Toastmasters, since they are sharp and interested in ideas, yet accept a more standard spread of (often muddled) views found in our culture. Notably, none of these target audiences contains a single philosopher. I'm not much of a fan of philosophers writing for their own profession.

    Matt does mention that my papers "vary in quality," which is certainly true. In particular, they vary in their substantiative and methodological veracity. I am still very much on the steep part of the learning curve in philosophy. So I often approach my graduate papers as serious explorations of ideas, rather than attempts to settle my views for all time. One of my hopes is that, by posting these papers, my errors will come to light through comments from readers. Exposing my known errors to the world -- including those found in my undergraduate work -- reminds me of and motivates me in all the learning I have yet to do. Reading though my humble beginnings in philosophy might show present philosophical beginners that good philosophizing is a skill that develops over time with knowledge and practice, not an innate talent. Of course, I also think that I made some interesting points in those earlier papers. Really, my only concern about posting those papers is that they might be plagiarized.

    Generally speaking, although I do not take a casual approach to my writings, my basic attitude is that I am perfectly willing to err, even in a spectacular and public fashion. Of course, I would prefer not to do so. Of course, I strive to avoid it. But when it happens, I take it as an opportunity to learn and grow, rather than a blow to my self-image. In contrast, when I joined Toastmasters back in 2001, I rather disliked being told pretty much anything other than that my speech was wonderful. Although I understood its theoretical function, I was generally averse to criticism. But in that friendly and supportive environment, I quickly realized that improvement required strong and direct criticism. Of course, some forms of criticism are genuinely destructive. Good criticism aims at correcting errors by noting and encouraging some change for next time. My attitude towards the possibility of error and the value of criticism changed for the better, I think.

    That shift in attitude is why I was so thrilled with Greg Salmieri's critical comments on my paper on false excuses at the UPitt Graduate Philosophy Conference. On the one hand, I learned that my basic approach to ethics and politics, as found in that paper, was all wrong. That's a bit of an ouch. But at the same time, I also made a huge advance in my understanding. Wow! That's utterly fantastic! (A post on the substance of that issue is still in the works.)

    That shift in attitude is also why the tepid intellectual atmosphere of TOC quickly became unbearable to me. In presenting my two papers to the Advanced Seminar, I was expecting hard-hitting commentary from a deeply Objectivist perspective somewhere in the two hours of discussion. Such criticism, I knew, was necessary for improvement in my work. As I put it the point elsewhere: "I wanted my papers to be raked over the Objectivist coals by scholars who know the philosophy inside and out, not tepidly reviewed from a vaguely Objectivist perspective. I wanted to be respectfully but firmly held to the highest standards, even though failure may sometimes be confusing, painful, and frustrating. I wanted to be quickly and strongly challenged if I ignored some aspect of Objectivism on some issue. Yet such hard scrutiny, high standards, demands for seriousness was beyond the will and grasp of TOC." (As I've indicated elsewhere, I see such as a prime example of bad theory generating sorry practice.)

    My shift in attitude toward error also played a significant role in my disassociation from TOC, in that I was more than willing to publicly admit my error, even given ten years of vigorous support and active involvement with the organization. When I saw systemic problems at TOC, I was willing to consider and investigate philosophic origins. When I realized the necessity of departure, I didn't slink off into the night. Yet my embarrassment has been quite painful at times, given the magnitude and duration of my error.

    I should note, however, that I do not feel either guilt or shame, as I did not ever evade as far as I know. Honest error was easier than skeptics might think. I read Truth and Toleration only a few short months after first reading Ayn Rand's essays. The ARI supporters I knew often acted as if the errors in it were self-evident, such that you were obviously corrupt if you didn't see them right away. Often these people hadn't even bothered to read the work at all, let alone understand it in any detail. No knowledgeable critiques of it were available. When I read T&T for only the second time this winter, profound and disastrous errors certainly popped out at me. The first time around, I was simply not in a position to see them.

    Speaking generally, my prior fear of error and aversion to criticism seems to have been the result of regarding ignorance by itself as a moral failing. In my experience, that's a common attitude amongst smart young people, as they are used to understanding so much so quickly. But Rand was right: Evasion is the root of all evil... and there is a world of difference between errors of knowledge and breaches of morality.

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    Saturday, April 10, 2004

    The Wonders of Google

    By Diana Hsieh

    Google searches reveal the most interesting information. Did you know, for example, that I was mentioned in a November 14, 2003 Christian Science Monitor article entitled Employees let off steam online? No? Well, neither did I. (Paul and I do subscribe to the Monitor, as it is an excellent paper. Just imagine the shock of reading about myself over my cup of morning tea! But alas, I missed the article in the print edition.)

    And indeed, I would have been shocked, given the three errors packed into a single sentence:

    There has yet to be any significant blogging lawsuit - except for the Church of Scientology's case against California blogger Diana Hsieh for suggesting that a link exists between Scientology and a firearms training facility.


    Correction #1: I am not a California blogger, but rather a Colorado blogger. I moved from California to Colorado long before the lawsuit was ever filed.

    Correction #2: The lawsuit against me was filed by Ignatius Piazza and Front Sight. Although the case concerns negative statements I made about Scientology, to the best of my knowledge, the Church of Scientology is not involved in the lawsuit.

    Correction #3: My concern centered around Front Sight Founder and Director Ignatius Piazza's personal involvement with Scientology, not any direct connection between Front Sight and Scientology.

    In all likelihood, the reporter simply accepted the information as (inaccurately) summarized on MetaFilter or somesuch, without bothering to check the source. That's disappointing, since the correct information was just a click away.

    The case was summarized far more accurately in the Las Vegas Weekly back in October. Also available online is Dr. Stephen Kent's expert witness report.

    As the case is ongoing, I've generally adopted a policy of saying nothing about it. But two bits of good news seem worth noting. First, Front Sight's case against me has been dismissed, such that Piazza is now the only plaintiff. Second, opposing council waited too long to schedule my deposition, so now they shall not get that opportunity before trial. Double Yeah!

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    Women as a Force of Civilization

    By Diana Hsieh

    Really, you have to wonder what kind of person this guy was before his wife died:

    :"Red" Rountree insists he's had a good life, an odd statement coming from a 92-year-old now serving a 12-year sentence for robbing a Texas bank. Mr. Rountree told the Associated Press that he stopped behaving after his wife died in 1986--hanging out with the wrong sort, taking to drink, experimenting with drugs and, eventually, robbing banks. He knocked over his first at age 86, in Mississippi, and a year later became the oldest inmate in Florida's prison system when he was convicted of robbing another in Pensacola. But he makes no apologies. "You want to know why I rob banks?" he asked the AP. "It's fun. I feel good, awful good. I feel good for sometimes days, for sometimes hours."


    Sheesh. And from the same page, more abuse of anti-trust laws:

    At the University of Wisconsin, where protesters once blew up the Army Math Research Center, a new generation of activists has filed a complaint in state court accusing two-dozen local drinking establishments of violating antitrust laws by collectively agreeing to eliminate their Friday- and Saturday-night drink specials. The bar owners told the Chronicle of Higher Education that they were simply responding to a call from the university to help cut down on student binge drinking. A lawyer for the tavern league told the paper: "When you combine a student with imagination with a lawyer with time on his hands, this is what you get."


    I say that this is an "abuse" of anti-trust, but really, much like with heroine, there is no such thing as wise use.

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    Wednesday, April 7, 2004

    A Technical Note

    By Diana Hsieh

    Since Chris was having so much trouble with my defective comments script, I cleaned up his entries by adding the proper URLs to the proper places. (I also deleted Roger's extra post.) Most importantly, I fixed the script. This took a bit of digging, as I'm a bit rusty on my PERL regexps. (The problem was very minor and quite obvious in retrospect. Doh!) Oh, and I also made the comment box larger, although surely not nearly large enough for many of the recent comments!

    So by all means, continue the big debate.

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    The Theory and Practice of Communism

    By Diana Hsieh

    David Frum has some interesting observations about the theory and practice of communism in a flashback commentary on Anne Applebaum's Gulag: A History. He writes:

    ...Applebaum is ultimately interested less in the Gulag's horror than its creators' motives. We today may look back on the camp era and see only waste: Stalin's "preposterous public-works projects," as Remnick calls them. But that's not how it seemed to many at the time. At the time, many Westerners paid tribute to the Soviet Union's achievements -- its mighty dams and railways, its cities in the Arctic circle and vast farms of irrigated grain. Even anti-Communists like Richard Crossman, editor of The God That Failed, paid tribute to the "terrifying efficiency" of the Soviet economy: Liberated from petty concerns like profit and loss and cost-accounting, the Soviets could do things that no capitalist society would ever dare attempt. Andrei Amalrik, in his Notes of a Revolutionary, recalls Canadian prime minister Pierre Trudeau's visit to the Siberian city of Norilsk. Trudeau lamented that Canada had never succeeded in building so large a city so far north -- unaware, or unconcerned, that Norilsk had been built by prisoners.

    Any decent person can recognize the inhumanity and cruelty of the Gulag (though as a matter of record, a remarkable number of people who considered themselves decent managed to avoid recognizing it when it counted). But what Applebaum emphasizes, as nobody before her has done, is the Gulag's sheer stupid pointlessness.

    Who would set prisoners to work digging an unnecessary canal from the White Sea to the Baltic using only hand tools? How could anybody imagine that starving slaves could outproduce American factories? Were the Soviets crazy?

    Applebaum does not answer this question directly -- but she provides the evidence for the reader to find the answer for himself. The Soviets were not crazy. They believed that society's wealth consisted in something called the "surplus value" of the worker's labor. In a capitalist society, the capitalist stole that surplus value. In the Communist fairyland of tomorrow, the worker would keep the surplus for his own benefit. In the meantime, Marxian theory suggested, the emerging socialist state could develop by appropriating for itself the surplus value that had previously enriched the capitalist. And if the worker could be forced to eat less, to live in a barracks instead of a house, to wear rags rather than clothes -- why then the surplus would be even bigger, and the state would advance even faster, and the Communist fairyland would arrive even sooner.

    It all made a terrible sense -- that is, if you accepted the crackpot economics on which the plan rested. In other words, just as Solzhenitsyn traced the responsibility for the creation of the Gulag back from Stalin to Lenin, so Applebaum follows the path all the way back to Das Kapital. She shows us that the Gulag is not just an incident in the history of Russia. It is the culmination of the history of socialism.


    Given that so many people laud communist theory while decrying communist practice, such arguments logically connecting the theory to the practice seem particularly important to develop and advance. Yet in my readings on communism so far, they seem quite rare. I'm not entirely certain why, although I suspect a lack of deep interest in and/or understanding of Marx's dialectical materialism, as well as the commonality between the altruism of communism and that of its oftentimes Christian critics.

    Of course, communist countries do vary somewhat in their theory... and thus in their practice. Based upon Nien Cheng's Life and Death in Shanghai, Mao's communism seemed to take on more of an idealist flair. Soldiers in the Red Army, for example, were expected to achieve victory on the basis of will alone, despite being poorly equipped. To suggest otherwise was cause for a prison term. Nor would I deny that, for example, Stalin's extreme paranoia substantially impacted the particulars of Soviet policy. But these are merely minor variations upon the major themes.

    At the end of his book Communism: A History, Richard Pipes has an interesting discussion of the connection between communist theory and practice. While I don't agree with some aspects of his analysis -- and none of it goes deep enough -- it is quite interesting. Let me quote at length from the chapter "Looking Back":

    We are now in a position to address the question posed in the Preface: whether the failure of communism "was due to human error or to flaws inherent in its very nature." The record of history strongly suggests the latter to be the case. Communism was not a good idea that went wrong; it was a bad idea.

    ...

    Marxism, the theoretical foundation of Communism, carried within it the seeds of its own destruction, such as Marx and Engels had wrongly attributed to capitalism. It rested on a faulty philosophy of history as well as an unrealistic psychological doctrine.

    Marxism's basic contention that private property, which it strives to abolish, is a transient historical phenomenon--an interlude between primitive and advanced Communism--is plainly false. All evidence indicates that land, the main source of wealth in premodern times, unless monopolized by monarchs, had always belonged to tribes, families, or individuals. Livestock as well as commerce and the capital to which it gives rise were always and everywhere in private hands. From which it follows that private property is not a transient phenomenon but a permanent feature of social life, and, as such, indestructible.

    No less flawed is Marxism's notion that human nature is infinitely malleable, and hence that a combination of coercion and education can produce beings purged of acquisitiveness and willing to dissolve in society at large, a society where, as envisioned by Plato, "the private and individual is altogether banished from life." Even if the immense pressures exerted by Communist regimes to this end were to succeed, their success would at best be ephemeral: as animal trainers have discovered, after being subjected to intensive drilling to perform tricks, animals, freed from training, after a while forget what they have learned and revert to their instinctive behavior. Furthermore, given that acquired characteristics are not heritable, each new generation will bring into the world non-Communist attitudes, among which acquisitiveness is certainly not the least powerful. Communism ultimately was defeated by its inability to refashion human nature...

    Such realities have forced Communist regimes to resort to violence as a routine means of governance. To compel people to give up what they own and to surrender their private interests to the state requires that public authority dispose of boundless authority. This is what Lenin meant when he defined the "dictatorship of the proletariat" as "power that is limited by nothing, by no laws, that is restrained by absolutely no rules, that rests directly on coercion."

    Experience indicates that such a regime is, indeed, feasible: it has been imposed on Russia and its dependencies, on China, Cuba, Vietnam, and Cambodia, as well as on a variety of countries in Africa and Latin America. But its price is not only enormous human suffering, it is also the destruction of the very objective for which such regimes are established, namely equality.

    In advocating a regime resting on coercion, Lenin assumed that it would be temporary; its mussion accomplished, the coercive state would wither away. He ignored, however, that the abstraction called "state" is made up of individuals who, whatever their historical mission, attend also to their private interests. Although in Marxist sociology the state serves only the owners of property and has no stake of its own, in reality the stewards quickly evolve into a new class. The "vanguard part" meant to usher in a new era becomes an end in itself.

    The state--or more precisely, the Communist Party--has no choice but to accommodate this new class because it depends upon it to stay in power. And under Communism, the officialdom grows by leaps and bounds for the simple reason that inasmuch as all aspects of national life, the economy very much included, are taken over by the state, it requires a large bureaucracy to administer it. This bureaucracy is the favorite scapegoat of every Communist regime, yet none can manage without it. In the Soviet Union, within a few years of the Bolshevik coup d'etat, the regime began to offer unique rewards to its leading cadres, which in time evolved into the nomenklatura, a hereditary privileged class. This spelled the end of the ideal of equality. Thus to enforce the equality of possessions it is necessary to institutionalize inequality of rights. The contradiction between ends and means is built into Communism and into every country where the state owns all the productive wealth.

    True, periodic attempts have been made to shake off the grip that the Communist officialdom secured on the state and society. Lenin and Stalin tried purges, which under Stalin led to mass murder. Mao launched his "Cultural Revolution" to destroy entrenched party interests. None of these attempts succeeded. In the end, the nomenklaturas won out because without them nothing would work.

    Attempts to introduce Communism by democratic means also failed. As the experience of Allende's Chile demonstrates, the assault on private property in the presence of a relatively free press, an independent judiciary, and an elected legislature cannot succeed because the opposition, which under a "dictatorship of the proletariat" is ruthlessly crushed, here has the opportunity to organize resistance. As its numbers swelled, it easily toppled the revolutionary regime. In Nicaragua, where in 1990 the Communist Sandinistas felt enough confidence in their popularity to submit themselves to a popular vote, the people swept them out of power.

    The bureaucratization inherent in Communist regimes was also responsible for the economic failures that either contributed to their downfall or else compelled them to abandon Communism in all but name. The nationalization of productive assets let to the transfer of their management to officials who had neither the competence nor the motivation to operate them efficiently. The inevitable result was declining productivity. Furthermore, the rigidity inherent in centralized management made Communist economies unresponsive to technological innovation, which explains why the Soviet Union, despite its high level of science, missed out on some of the most important technological discoveries of recent times. As Friedrich Hayek has pointed out, only the free market has the ability to sense and respond to shifts in the economy. And only the prospect of enrichment motivates people to exert themselves beyond their immediate needs. Under Communism, effective incentives were lacking: indeed, diligence at work was punished, in that meeting one's productivity quotas resulted in these quotas being raised.

    ...

    Nor is the inability to provide abundance and enforce equality, its alleged objectives, the only contradiction inherent in Communism. Another is the lack of freedom, which along with equality and abundance was for Marx the ultimate objective of a Communist society. The nationalization of all productive resources turns all citizens into state employees--in other words, dependents of the government. Under such conditions, there are no effective limits to state power. In the words of Trotsky: "In a country where the sole employer is the state, opposition means slow starvation. The old principle, who does not work shall not eat, has been replaced by a new one: who does not obey shall not eat." Only the recognition by the state of right of its citizens to their belongings--and respect shown to this right--ensures freedom. And inasmuch as property is a legal concept, enforced by the courts, it also signifies that the state is bound by law. This means that the goal of Communism, the abolition of property, inevitably leads to the abolition of liberty and legality. The nationalization of productive resources, far from liberating men from enslavement by things, as Marx and Engels had envisioned, converts them into slaves of their rulers and, because of endemic shortages, makes them more materialistic than ever.

    ...

    These inherent flaws were acknowledged by many Communists, leading to various "revisionisms." To the true believers, however, the failures proved not that the doctrine was wrong but that it had not been applied with sufficient ruthlessness. Confirming Santayana's definition of fanatics as people who redouble their efforts after forgetting their aim, they went on killing sprees of mounting savagery. Thus Communism generated ever greater oceans of blood as it progressed from Lenin to Stalin, and from Stalin to Mao and Pol Pot.


    So does anyone know of a deep analysis of the connections between the theory and practice of communism? Oh, and a how about a good introductory text on Marxism? (Is Thomas Sowell's worth reading? Any others?)

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    Monday, April 5, 2004

    A Hegelian Synthesis

    By Diana Hsieh

    What do you have when you combine a square-wheeled bicycle with just the right kind of bumpy road? In a lovely little Hegelian thesis-antithesis-synthesis, you get a perfectly smooth ride. Really. (Scooped from GeekPress by reading over Paul's shoulder.)

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    Congratulations!

    By Diana Hsieh

    Late this afternoon, I was lying in bed with New Kitty (a.k.a Elliot) reading Anne Applebaum's so-far-excellent book Gulag: A History. (I was rather exhausted after spending the day up in Boulder for the tail end of the Rocky Mountain Virtue Ethics Summit.) Paul called to say hello. He told me that the book I was just reading at that very moment had been awarded the Pulitzer Prize for general non-fiction. How cool! I've certainly enjoyed the book so far, although I'm not even 100 pages into it. It's a clear, engaging, and compelling account of one of the the horrors of the Soviet regime.

    So congratulations to Anne Applebaum!

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    Rationalistic Rights

    By Diana Hsieh

    If you plug your laptop in at the airport or train station, are you stealing electricity? According to many of the folks commenting on this Samizdata post, the answer is clearly YES. Since you do not have permission to use the electrical outlet, you are a thief, albeit a small one.

    Such an answer seems to me to imply a very rationalistic understanding of rights. Most businesses are happy to provide complimentary services to their customers. Although we may ask where the restrooms are, we do not ask our waitress whether we have permission to use them. When we buy a latte at Starbucks, we do not ask permission to consume some of the sugar or take a napkin. Such social conventions facilitate human interaction and trade by establishing a default, a default which may nonetheless still be overridden by express statements. Notably, that default is limited to a certain range of reasonable action. We certainly do not have implicit permission redecorate the restaurant's bathroom or to take hundreds of napkins.

    Although the phenomena of plugging in laptops is a relatively recent one, there is little reason to suspect that the convention is resented or unwelcome to business owners. If it were, we would expect to see blocked off outlets, stickers on outlets forbidding plugging in, and so on. We would expect business owners to throw out plugged-in laptop users or perhaps even call the police to arrest them.

    People often don't notice these conventions of trade, precisely because they are so completely taken for granted. (One of the hazards and excitements of foreign travel is that such conventions do change.) Nonetheless, they are a real and important part of social interactions, one which claims about rights violations ought to be sensitive. To ignore them is to treat rights as floating abstractions unconnected to actual facts about social interaction... and that only leads to trouble.

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    Socialist Dreamin'

    By Diana Hsieh

    A few weeks ago, a friend of mine mentioned that there were people who called themselves "socialist libertarians." I found this to be rather astonishing and implausible at the time, but apparently true. Here's the "Manifesto" of Socialist Libertarianism:

    [...] There's been a lot of rhetoric in American politics that equates libertarianism with capitalism, particularly from the followers of A*y*n R*a*n*d. In their minds, libertarianism is exclusively about selfishness. There's no room for community. All that is important is the right of the monied few to make more and more money without government restriction.

    I do not consider these to be true libertarians because inevitably they turn into mouthpieces for self-centered de facto despots who want no checks on their right to enslave others. They also hold that the people are stupid and that only their gods offer a true creative impulse. They point to Frank Lloyd Wright as an example of their genius, not mentioning that every one of his stylish Prarie-Style houses is falling down because he did not listen to contemporaries who warned him that they needed more structural support. They never speak up to the fact that you can be fired for criticizing your boss, that the moment you walk in your workplace in the morning, you lose your rights to freedom of speech and freedom to organize into unions. Corporations severely limit what you can say within them and what changes you make within them. Only those whose imaginations end at the board room door think that they offer ultimate freedom.

    There are true capitalist libertarians, but these I have mentioned do not fit the criteria. As a socialist libertarian, I hold firm on the principle that I must not only be free to speak, but ready to listen to reasonable points of view. Where the capitalist libertarian puts the emphasis on protecting the making of money, I put it on protecting what we hold in common. I style myself after John Stuart Mill who held that it was for the good of the community that we must have freedom of speech, that even stupid points of view must be allowed their day if only to show their stupidity.

    All libertarians hold that any law should be carefully considered. Is social pressure enough? Is the damage being done by the act physically real and prosecutable? The socialist libertarian goes on to ask does this law benefit only one person or the whole community? We allow no despots in socialist libertarianism, we prevent no organization of people within the greater body politic. We thus oppose not only the excesses of Capitalism, but those of Communism as well. Russia failed because it did not allow correction of its economy by free voices. It failed because it was taken over by conservative leadership. It failed because it did not respect diversity in outlook. The socialist libertarian holds that diversity is a good thing, that free markets do benefit us in some affairs, but in things we all share -- water purification systems, electricity, roads, police and fire, parkland -- profit can only warp and seduce us towards authoritarianism and loss of resources. A socialist libertarian does not enter the house of the man who wants to be self-sustaining in energy because there is no need to have him for the sake of profit. For this reason and for reasons of better air and water quality (things that are shared by everyone), it is the socialist libertarian who champions solar energy and other clean fuels. Only under our present system of capitalist authoritarianism are contracts made to limit energy independence. Capitalist libertarians, too, love these things, but only the socialist libertarian takes steps to allow everyone to have the means of independence in their lives, to supplement incomes and make it possible for everyone to put a solar generator on her or his roof if he/she desires. This is one of the reasons why I am a socialist libertarian: it puts all people first. It does not naively say that only through selfishness can there be freedom. We've seen too many despots rise on selfishness and we're looking, encouraging other ways.

    [...] Community property exists for all people. All libertarians believe that there should be some laws. The question is what do they protect first: private interest or the good of all the people?


    Oh, where to begin!?!

    Clearly, such "socialist libertarianism" bears no substantial resemblance to libertarianism as it is normally understood. The use of the term is a sneaky way of casting massive government coercion as genuine freedom. The same corruption has visited upon the concepts freedom, liberty, rights, censorship, and liberalism -- just to name a few.

    Yet we might still ask: Precisely what meaning does the concept "libertarianism" have? Is there some set of core political doctrines held in common by those commonly considered libertarians, such as Milton Friedman, John Locke, Jan Narveson, Ayn Rand, David Friedman, George H. Smith, Rod Long, Adam Smith, Friedich Hayek, Julian Simon, Ludwig Von Mises, Murray Rothbard, Thomas Jefferson, and so on? I think not. Such libertarian thinkers differ widely in the foundations of their political views: moral versus economic, egoistic versus altruistic, utilitarian versus deontological versus teleological, and so on. They differ in their substantive views of the proper political order. Some libertarians are anarchists; they seek to abolish the state in favor of private defense agencies. Others advocate a minimal state limited to police, the courts, and national defense. Others are willing to use government to solve so-called market failures, educate children, and provide for the poor. Such libertarians also often diverge in their implementation of rights, including on abortion, self-defense, animal rights, intellectual property, and more. Given these substantial and wide-ranging differences, the term "libertarianism" seems to be based upon family resemblance more than any feature (or features) common to all. Such a mixed-bag concept seems epistemologically indefensible to me... and virtually useless.

    Interestingly, the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy summarizes libertarianism as follows:

    In political philosophy 'libertarianism' is a name given to a range of views which take as their central value liberty or freedom. Although occasionally the term is applied to versions of anti-authoritarian Marxist theory (the 'libertarian left'), more commonly it is associated with a view which champions particularly pure forms of capitalism. Libertarians endorse the free market and unfettered free exchange, and oppose paternalistic or moralistic legislation (for example, laws regulating sexual behaviour or the consumption of alcohol or drugs). Liberty, on such a view, is identified with the absence of interference by the state or by others. The legitimate state exists purely to guard individual rights, protecting people and their property from force, theft and fraud. This is the 'minimal state' or 'night-watchman state' of classical liberalism. The state has no authority to engage in the redistribution of property (except to rectify the effects of theft, and so on) or, in certain versions at least, to pursue policies designed to further the common good. Such activities are viewed by the libertarian as illegitimate interferences with an individual's right to do what they wish with their own person or property.


    This sketch of libertarianism seems fairly reasonable, in that it encompasses a fairly narrow and definite range of political views. It explicitly appeals to individual rights. It excludes both anarchism and state intrusion to futher "the common good." It references particular freedoms endorsed by libertarianism. Of course, it doesn't mention the philosophic foundations of rights and minimal government. But must it do so? In keeping with the orthodox Objectivist view, I regard a proper metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical foundation as indispensable to politics. Yet I also wonder whether the concept "libertarianism" can abstract away from such foundations in much the same way that the concepts "egoism" and "selfishness" seem to do.

    In the introduction to The Virtue of Selfishness, Ayn Rand discusses the ways in which the term "selfishness" has been subject to a particularly nasty package-deal. The term actually means "concern with one's own interests" but is used so as to evoke the image of "a murderous brute who tramples over piles of corpses to achieve his own ends, who cares for no living being and pursues nothing but the gratification of the mindless whims of any immediate moment." She advocates redeeming the concept by returning it to its genuine meaning of "concern with one's own interests." Notably, Rand is not advocating the creation of a new, more positive package-deal. She acknowledges the reality of irrational, subjectivist forms of egoism in which "any action, regardless of its nature, is good if it is intended for one's own benefit." She notes that her own ethic requires not merely selfishness, but also "a rational, objectively demonstrated and validated code of moral principles which define and determine his actual self-interest."

    Given the existence of forms of selfishness and egoism deeply opposed to the rational type advocated by Objectivism, the fact that someone is an egoist will not tell us much about the truth of his ethics as whole. The person might be radically mistaken about the nature of his self-interest, opting for predation rather than production and trade. Worse still, he might appeal to deeply faulty epistemological methods to determine self-interest, such as emotion or authority rather than reason. So the mere fact that someone advocates egoism will not make them an "ethical ally," so to speak.

    Similarly, a profession of libertarianism might indicate little about the rationality, consistency, or truth of a person's political views as a whole. Due to weak, confused, or outright false philosophical foundations, a libertarian might advance arguments and advocate views which are deeply flawed and ultimately destructive of liberty. (Examples would include subjectivist, religious, and altruist versions of libertarianism.) So on this view, even though the Objectivist politics is a form of libertarianism, Objectivists ought not ally themselves with any and all libertarians. They ought to be careful in their political alliances by attending to the philosophical justifications for liberty offered.

    On the surface, this argument from analogy is fairly plausible. But in explicitly formulating it here and examining the details of Ayn Rand's analysis of the concept "selfishness," it now seems to me that the that similarity is only skin deep. The argument about egoism only works because the beneficiary of an action is only one aspect of a total moral theory. As Ayn Rand herself writes, "the choice of the beneficiary of moral values is merely a preliminary or introductory issue in the field of morality." In contrast, libertarianism is supposed to be a fairly comprehensive political theory, not merely one aspect thereof. So any substantial differences between versions of libertarianism would have to arise out of substantial differences in the underlying philosophy. And major differences in metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics would indicate that the political theories really aren't all that similar in the end, such that to classify them all as "libertarian" would be to focus on inessentials. However, substantially similar political theories with substantially similar philosophical foundations could be justly united under a single concept. For the reasons outlined here, I would say that any concept which included the Objectivist politics would at least require foundational adherence to reason, egoism, harmony of interests, and mind-body integration.

    Many people do opt for a different approach, namely that of reducing libertarianism to a single principle: the rejection of the initiation of force. As an example of this view, the oath required to join the Libertarian Party is merely: "I certify that I do not believe in or advocate the initiation of force as a means of achieving political or social goals." This approach is untenable, even dangerous, because it strips libertarianism of the content which gives it meaning, such that it can become just about anything to anybody.

    The basic problem is that what does or does not constitute coercion is radically dependent upon prior notions of the range of actions to which an individual is entitled. If I am not entitled to the money I earn, then the government is not coercing me by redistributing it to the needy. If I am not entitled to self-defense, then I am initiating force in warding off a rapist. If I am not entitled to my car, then anyone may use and abuse it. My friend Jimmy Wales has argued this point nicely in answering the question "how does forcing a property-owner to do without his property by taking it from him without his consent, in itself, constitute 'coercion'?"

    It is not possible to define coercion in this context without appeal to a theory of rights. Cutting it down to the most bare bones example, consider yourself and a common thief. The thief wants to take your television. One of your desires will be frustrated. He'll either get your television, or he won't. If you keep your t.v. (perhaps tossing him out of your house before he can grab it) have you initiated force against him? Or did he initiate force against you by trying to take it in the first place?

    The only way to answer these questions is by an appeal to *moral right*. That is, who has a morally rightful *claim* to the television. And why?

    The Objectivist claim is that *you* have a morally rightful claim to the television, assuming you acquired it through honest production and trade. The source of this right is ultimately in the nature of humans, and the essential requirements for human survival in a society. You have a *moral* right, says Objectivism, to pursue your own values, to work and keep the product of your efforts. And you have a *moral* right to defend these values from people who would attempt to take them.


    So by stripping a rich political theory down to a single principle which is not even comprehensible in isolation, the focus on the non-initiation of force principle lends credence to the claims of socialists, communitarians, and other statists that they are the true libertarians. After all, they too are opposed to the use of force. They just simply understand what does and does not constitute force quite differently from you and me. And so we find the "Socialist Libertarian Manifesto" which began this post.

    I suspect that it is possible to form and define the concept "libertarianism" in an epistemologically respectable way. However, if done, then many people who are widely regarded as libertarians will no longer be so, leading to chaos in communication. So perhaps it is best to avoid the term altogether. But really, it would be nice to have a single term to describe Ayn Rand's politics, since it does share many basic features with the politics of earlier thinkers like John Locke and some of the US Founding Fathers. In that case, "classical liberalism" would be a good general term. Yet Ayn Rand's philosophic foundations differ substantially from even those original classical liberals. So where does that leave me? Honestly, I'm not entirely sure.

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